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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
 DOING ENVY JUSTICE: EXAMINING THE POLITICS OF ENVY 
Conservatives and liberals disagree about the underlying motivations driving opposition 
to concentrated wealth. Liberals contend that such objections are often driven by 
legitimate fairness concerns, whereas conservatives frequently cite envy instead. 
Research and theory suggest that two particularly important contextual questions with 
respect to emotional reactions to wealth are its source (inherited or earned), and how that 
wealth is put to use, which could interactively and differentially influence liberals’ and 
conservatives’ reactions to affluent individuals. The current study aimed to empirically 
address whether liberals actually are more prone to envy than conservatives, both in 
general and in response to specific wealthy people of different backgrounds.  
Participants (N = 800) reported their reactions to ostensibly-real, wealthy entrepreneurs 
described in articles from a business news website. Liberals tended to respond with 
slightly more envy than conservatives across conditions, and controlling for several 
potential confounding factors, liberal political ideology was weakly positively correlated 
with dispositional envy. People across the political spectrum responded with greater envy 
in response to wealthy entrepreneurs who harmed others in the pursuit of wealth than 
entrepreneurs who did not harm others. However, liberals’ envy was increased more 
strongly by entrepreneurial harm-doing than conservatives’, and this difference was 
explained by greater perceived harm and unfairness. On the other hand, only 
conservatives reacted with greater envy to entrepreneurs who inherited their wealth rather 
than having earned it through hard work. Especially because, in addition to envy, liberals 
felt somewhat more resentment, moral disgust, and anger toward the wealthy 
entrepreneurs, further research will be necessary to fully understand the role of political 
ideology in reactions to affluent people.    
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Chapter One: Introduction 
United States President Barack Obama remarked in a 2013 speech that economic 
inequality “is the defining challenge of our time” and that frustration with that inequality 
is “rooted in the nagging sense that no matter how hard [average Americans] work, the 
deck is [unfairly] stacked against them.” The speech echoed concerns voiced at the 2012 
Democratic National Convention, in which Massachusetts Democrat Elizabeth 
Warren declared that “the system is rigged” in favor of the wealthy and against the middle 
class (ABC News, 2012). That same year, President Obama led a failed effort to institute a 
“Buffett Rule” to raise taxes on millionaires and billionaires who were “unfairly” paying 
lower rates on their investment earnings than middle-income Americans were on their 
wages (Davis, 2012).  
Conservatives often claim that liberal complaints about economic inequality and 
policy proposals aimed at redressing them are not, in reality, driven by the morally-
acceptable fairness concerns liberals frequently cite when demanding changes to the 
existing economic order. During the 2012 Presidential campaign, Republican candidate 
Mitt Romney was asked to respond to those who criticized substantial wealth disparities in 
the United States. In his reply, Romney stated, “I think it's about envy. I think it's about 
class warfare.” Columnist Kathleen Parker (2013) expressed a similar opinion quite 
plainly when she wrote, “Envy is the core emotion driving the current debate about 
income inequality and the notion that the poor are poor because the rich are rich.”  
The starkly contrasting views of leading liberals and conservatives typify a 
longstanding debate in American politics on how one should react to the great financial 
success of others. Are conservative thinkers often correct in attributing complaints over 
 
2 
 
disparities to envy? Or, as liberal thinkers suggest, do they more often reflect concerns 
over justice and fairness? The interpretation of negative reactions to wealth is no trivial 
matter. Because of envy’s repugnant nature (e.g., Smith & Kim, 2007), the motivations of 
people who seem driven by it are instantly cheapened, even legitimately scorned. By 
contrast, if expressed concerns about justice and fairness seem valid, then the motivation 
is honored and legitimized—and corrective action is the logical consequence. Votes are in 
the balance. Elections, therefore, partly hinge on which party wins this perennial 
attributional debate. 
Political Ideology 
Research on conservatism and liberalism reveals a complex, multi-faceted picture 
(Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003a, 2003b; Tetlock & Murphy, 1993; Wojcik, 
Hovasapian, Graham, Motyl, and Ditto, 2015). Nevertheless, there are consistent themes. 
For example, in a landmark meta-analytic review of the psychological literature on 
political conservatism, Jost and colleagues (2003a) concluded that the psychological bases 
for conservative ideology were (1) perceived threat from the environment, and (2) 
aversion to uncertainty. These bases ultimately motivate system-justification, 
authoritarianism, and various other psychological characteristics commonly associated 
with political conservatives (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950; 
Altemeyer, 1981, 1996; Jost & Hunyady, 2005). These factors underpin a “conservative” 
belief system with two core, related aspects, namely (1) support for or rationalization of 
inequality, and (2) resistance to change (Jost et al., 2003a, 2003b). This “uncertainty-
threat” model of political conservatism not only attempted to identify and tie together 
common themes in the empirical literature on political ideology, but also suggested 
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conservatives have a fundamental tendency toward viewing inequality as just and fair. 
Notably, core tenets of the uncertainty-threat model were empirically supported in a later 
set of three cross-sectional studies (Jost, Napier, Thorisdottir, Gosling, Palfai, & Ostafin, 
2007).1  
To the extent that liberal and conservative political ideologies represent opposite 
ends of a bipolar ideological spectrum, liberalism may imply a relative lack of 
uncertainty-threat, therefore leading to the opposition to inequality and calls for change so 
often associated with political progressives. Indeed, although definitions and 
operationalizations of political ideology vary widely and political ideology is a complex 
topic (Wojcik et al., 2015), a number of scholars have used bipolar measures implying 
that, to a large extent, liberalism and conservatism may be considered opposites (e.g., Jost, 
2006; Napier & Jost, 2008).  
Political ideology is also associated with basic personality differences that 
arguably are in keeping with both the abovementioned differences between liberal and 
conservative belief systems and the uncertainty-threat model. For example, liberals tend to 
be greater in openness to experience and one of two aspects of agreeableness, compassion 
(which is associated with liberal egalitarianism), while conservatives are better organized, 
conscientious, and polite (the other aspect of agreeableness, which helps in maintaining 
the social order) (Carney, Jost, Gosling, & Potter, 2008; Hirsh, DeYoung, Xu, & Peterson, 
2010). Clearly, conservatives and liberals differ appreciably in terms of a variety of 
                                                 
1 Specifically, higher levels of uncertainty avoidance (e.g., low openness to experience) and threat 
management concerns (e.g., perceptions that the world is a dangerous place) correlated positively with 
conservatism in each study within Jost et al. (2007). In the final study, moreover, the relationships between 
conservatism and threat and conservatism and uncertainty avoidance were mediated via opposition to 
equality and resistance to change, respectively. 
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psychological characteristics, beliefs, and even personality traits. Perhaps the most 
consequential difference for purposes of the current study is conservatives’ tendency to 
react less negatively to perceived inequality than liberals, consistent with the uncertainty-
threat model and empirical research on the psychology of political ideology. However, 
additional research suggests conservative “endorsement” of inequality may apply more to 
inequality of outcomes than inequality of opportunity.2 As fairness concerns are often 
crucial in the experiences of envy and resentment, differences in how fairness is defined 
by conservatives and liberals may lead to differences in their levels of envy and/or 
resentment of wealthy people. 
Political Ideology and Perceived Fairness 
Both liberals and conservatives value fairness (e.g., Haidt, 2012), but they have 
different conceptions of what would qualify as “fair” outcomes. Liberals are more likely 
to view equality of outcomes as a valid basis for fairness judgments (Jost, 2006; Rasinski, 
1987). In contrast, conservatives tend to base such judgments on the perceived 
proportionality between inputs (e.g., the perceived value of a worker’s labor) and 
outcomes (e.g., a worker’s salary) (Adams, 1965; Gollwitzer & van Prooijen, 2016; Haidt, 
2012; Haidt & Graham, 2007), although the perceived value of such inputs, and thus the 
“proportional,” deserved outcomes, often involves subjective judgment. Of course, such 
subjective judgments may be systematically influenced in the direction of greater 
perceived fairness by beliefs (e.g., belief in a just world) and motivated cognitive 
                                                 
2 This statement does not imply that conservatives are entirely unconcerned about distributive justice and 
equality of outcomes. Recent research in both the US (Norton & Ariely, 2011) and Australia (Norton, Neal, 
Ariely, & Holland, 2014) indicates that Americans and Australians across the political spectrum would 
prefer greater equality in the national distribution of wealth (or, put another way, greater society-wide 
distributive justice).  
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processes, such as system-justification, known to be more common among conservatives 
(Jost et al., 2003a; Lerner, 1980). A natural consequence of these dynamics is 
conservatives’ greater acceptance of unequal outcomes—some people’s inputs are worth 
more than others, and thus inequality, even substantial inequality, is not necessarily 
perceived to be unfair.  
Relative to conservatives, liberals’ general way of viewing fairness (often in terms 
of equality), their beliefs, and motivated cognitive processes likely predispose them to 
perceiving great disparities in wealth as inherently unfair or unjust (Janoff-Bulman & 
Carnes, 2013), an unfairness which may enhance envy and resentment of those possessing 
it (van de Ven, Zeelenberg, & Pieters, 2009; van de Ven, 2015). To be clear, however, 
liberals also value proportionality, and desire a more just world, despite believing the 
world is less fair than do conservatives (Engel & Martin, 2015; Tyler, 2011). For example, 
Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton (2016) voiced her support for a change in 
overtime rules primarily benefitting lower-middle income workers in declaring that “[W]e 
need to…restore the basic bargain that built America’s mighty middle class—that if you 
work hard and play by the rules, you can get ahead and stay ahead” (emphasis added). 
Both conservatives’ and liberals’ reactions to wealthy people might therefore be sensitive 
to contextual factors impacting judgments of the wealthy people’s advantageous 
outcomes. Such factors might include whether or not the outcomes were earned through 
hard work and whether actions taken in pursuit of those outcomes violated the implicit or 
explicit “rules” governing ethical economic behavior (e.g., not harming others for one’s 
own benefit).  
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I now address a number of challenges that may arise when investigating how 
political ideology and contextual factors might influence envious responses to wealth. To 
fully understand such envy, however, other emotional responses to perceived unfairness or 
injustice should also be taken into account, most notably resentment, but also anger and 
moral disgust. 
Challenges to Empirically Investigating Emotional Reactions to Wealthy People  
 In spite of abundant lay commentaries on the subject and its role in the 
contemporary political debate over inequality in America, there is relatively little 
psychological research on political ideology and envious reactions to great wealth. A 
recent correlational study by Harris and Henniger (2013), however, examined the 
relationship between dispositional envy and political ideology, using an online sample 
ranging widely in age and income. They found a weak, positive relationship between left-
wing ideology and dispositional envy, which became non-significant after controlling for 
participant age.3 The study therefore provided little evidence for claims by conservatives 
that complaints against great wealth might be linked to envy inspired by liberal political 
ideology. As will be seen, however, there are important conceptual reasons one should not 
assume that similar results would also obtain when examining envy toward specific 
wealthy people. 
Defining envy. Systematically examining liberal and conservative explanations for 
complaints against concentrated wealth (and income inequality) presents a number of 
conceptual and methodological challenges. One issue is how to define envy. As with other 
research on social emotions, including envy, and on related moral judgments (e.g., 
                                                 
3 Younger participants tended to be higher in dispositional envy and further left on the political spectrum. 
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perceived injustice), results and conclusions could vary dramatically on the basis of how 
such phenomena are defined and operationalized (Feather, 2012; Harris & Henniger, 
2013; Hoogland, Thielke, & Smith, in press; Miceli & Castelfranchi, 2007; Smith & Kim, 
2007). Thus, it is vitally important to delineate what is meant by the rather nebulous term 
“envy” in the context of the current work. 
Although there is considerable definitional debate in current theoretical and 
empirical research on envy, virtually all definitions of envy are similar in that they posit 
an upward social comparison as the basic antecedent to envy, and almost all agree that 
envy is at least somewhat painful or unpleasant (i.e., negatively-valenced) (but see Leach, 
Spears, Branscombe, & Doosje, 2003). However, much of the disagreement over other 
aspects of envy comes down to whether envy necessarily includes a degree of hostility 
toward the envied. The question is so critical that many researchers conclude that envy 
may assume two distinct forms, hostile envy and benign envy (Smith & Kim, 2007; van de 
Ven, Hoogland, Smith, van Dijk, Breugelmans, & Zeelenberg, 2015). This distinction has 
huge implications. Hostile envy clearly is more likely to lead to negative effects for the 
envied person (e.g., back stabbing, undermining, etc.; Duffy, Scott, Shaw, Tepper, & 
Aquino, 2012; Foster, 1972) and, indeed, unhappy consequences for the envying person as 
well (e.g., guilt and shame; Miceli & Castelfranchi, 2007). In fact, failure to clarify the 
distinction at the conceptual and empirical levels has led to confusion about the role of 
envy in various outcomes aside from reactions to great wealth (e.g., reactions to the 
misfortunes of various enviable people, such as schadenfreude4).  
                                                 
4 For example, finding a link as intuitively “obvious” as that between envy of an advantaged person and 
schadenfreude following his or her status-leveling downfall depends on researchers’ understanding and 
measurement of envy. Specifically, envy containing hostility and ill-will toward the advantaged person does 
lead to schadenfreude, whereas non-hostile, benign envy, and coveting (i.e., merely wanting what another 
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In the present research, I largely focus on hostile envy. Hostile envy corresponds to 
the more traditional sense of how envy, sometimes called “envy proper,” is understood in 
most religious, philosophical, and literary traditions (for a review, see Smith & Kim, 
2007). To illustrate with one very early example, in Aristotle’s Rhetoric (350 B.C.E./1924; 
Book II, Chapter 10), the ancient Greek philosopher’s discussion of envy repeatedly 
highlighted its hostile aspects: “We feel [envy]…not with the idea of getting something 
for ourselves, but because the other people have it [implying that the other people seem 
unworthy of that thing];” “We also envy those whose possession of or success in a thing is 
a reproach to us;” “[Enviable people who have suffered a misfortune] will feel no pity 
from us [i.e., those who envy them].” Also, envy proper corresponds more closely to how 
envy appears to be conceived of in everyday political debates. Returning to Mitt 
Romney’s appraisal of liberal complaints against wealth concentration as “class warfare,” 
it is clear that his view is that liberals often have envy-based ill will against well-moneyed 
people because of wealthy people’s superior outcomes and liberals’ presumed desire for 
them to lose their advantages. That is, the focus is less on wanting what the others have 
and much more on a hostile desire for them to lose their advantages.  
In sum, my primary approach to investigating the possible link between political 
ideology and envy entailed defining envy in terms similar to how it is conceived 
traditionally, by many contemporary envy scholars, and by political conservatives, such as 
Mitt Romney, who question the motives of those who actively oppose wealth 
                                                 
has), do not (Smith, Thielke, & Powell, 2014; van de Ven et al., 2015; cf. Feather & Sherman, 2002; Hareli 
& Weiner, 2002; Leach et al., 2003; Leach & Spears, 2008). In contrast, Harris and Henniger (2013) found 
similar associations between political liberalism and two different measures of dispositional envy, namely 
the full Dispositional Envy Scale (DES; Smith, Parrott, Diener, Hoyle, & Kim, 1999) and an ad hoc, 
dispositional “materialistic envy” scale, which focused on the desire for physical goods and was comprised 
of 3 items from the DES. 
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concentration in the United States. That is, I define envy as a begrudging, hostility-laden 
emotion. Doing so allowed for a more direct investigation of whether liberals actually are 
more prone to “envy” wealthy people in the particularly socially-undesirable sense of the 
term used more typically by laypeople and scholars—as well as those who claim that 
liberals are feeling the emotion.5  
Examining trait vs. state envy. Another challenge to studying envy concerns 
whether it is being examined from a trait or state perspective. Indeed, envy has been 
studied as both an enduring disposition and a fleeting emotional state (Lange & Crusius, 
2015; van de Ven et al., 2015), as well as a conscious or unconscious experience (e.g., 
Miceli & Castelfranchi, 2007). For instance, research by Harris and Henniger (2013) 
focused on self-reported general tendencies toward envy and did not measure real-time 
emotional reactions to specific enviable people. For a variety of reasons, the distinction 
between envy as a disposition and envy as an emotional state is a particularly important 
one to make when examining whether envy differs as a function of political ideology. For 
one, even people very low in the dispositional tendency to feel envy may experience 
powerful feelings of (state) envy given the right circumstances. It is also possible that 
liberals or conservatives do not differ at all in terms of their dispositional tendencies 
toward feeling envy but that liberals (or conservatives) might still feel more state envy in 
specific circumstances. Envy of wealthy people could be one such circumstance, given 
that liberals and conservatives differ considerably in terms of their perceptions of 
concentrated wealth and, presumably, those who possess it (Janoff-Bulman, 2009; Janoff-
                                                 
5 Nonetheless, although not the primary topic of investigation, this study also explored whether and how 
other forms of envy (such as “benign envy”) were associated with political ideology, given the ongoing 
scholarly debate over how envy, in whatever form(s), should be defined and measured (Smith & Kim, 2007; 
Smith, 1991, 2013; van de Ven, Zeelenberg, & Pieters, 2009). 
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Bulman & Carnes, 2013). Such perceptions might, of course, tend to either exacerbate or 
ameliorate liberals’ and/or conservatives’ envy of specific wealthy people.  
The pattern of results across dispositional and state envy could also be instructive. 
For example, if the magnitude of the difference between liberals and conservatives on 
envy is greater on (1) state envy of specific wealthy people than it is on (2) dispositional 
envy, this might suggest that certain aspects of exceptionally financially successful people 
(or their histories) are exacerbating what might normally be a very slight difference in 
envy between conservatives and liberals (e.g., some wealthy people’s having received 
large inheritances, giving them a major advantage in life). In sum, the current study allows 
for an investigation of not only envy as a disposition (by the inclusion of personality 
questionnaires on dispositional envy), but also state envy in reaction to specific kinds of 
wealthy people, who may be perceived differently by people on opposite sides of the 
conservative-liberal divide.  
Differentiating envy and resentment. The current study examines more than the 
very broad question of whether envious reactions to wealthy people vary as a function of 
political ideology. Envy is only one of a number of different possible emotional reactions 
to great wealth, and contextual factors might impact liberals’ and conservatives’ reactions 
to wealthy people in many different ways. In addition to envy, such contextual factors 
could influence fairness or justice perceptions, as well as levels of morally-relevant 
emotions other than envy, such as resentment. If, for example, liberals do indeed tend to 
envy wealthy individuals more than conservatives, such envy and resulting opposition to 
their wealth might still be “legitimated” to the extent that the envy is accompanied or 
explained by justice concerns often cited by liberals as the “true” reasons for their 
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objections to concentrated wealth (Rawls, 1971). In sum, the current study obviates the 
possibility of over-attributing important political ideology-based differences in reactions 
to wealthy people to envy alone and oversimplifying a potentially much more nuanced, 
context-dependent and emotionally complex reality. 
Distinguishing envy from related emotions can be challenging, but doing so may 
be especially important for understanding reactions to great wealth, in general, and how 
such reactions are related to political ideology, in particular. As an earlier example 
suggests, it is likely that liberals believe their concerns over great wealth are captured by 
feelings of resentment and legitimate judgments of unfairness. By contrast, it appears that 
conservatives are not only more likely to view great wealth as fair in the first place, but 
also to view liberal complaints as motivated by envy. 
Disentangling the emotion of envy (especially hostile envy) from 
resentment/feelings of unfairness is far from straightforward, but the advantages of an 
approach in which envy and resentment are examined separately are at least four-fold. 
First, although envy and resentment often co-occur, unlike envy, resentment can be 
experienced in the absence of any sense that someone else is advantaged relative to 
oneself. Second, separating resentment from envy allows resentment to represent a sense 
of anger or hostility that is (at least ostensibly) free of envious feelings, and therefore 
more socially acceptable or “legitimate.” Third, separating envy-based resentful feelings 
from resentment proper acknowledges the vital role of different kinds of fairness 
judgments to the experiences of envy and resentment. Specifically, the dividing line 
between resentment proper and invidious resentment (the hostile component of envy) is 
the perception of whether the great majority of other “reasonable” people would agree that 
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the other person’s advantage is unjust—if so, the advantage is “objectively” unjust and the 
resulting feeling is more akin to “resentment proper” and thus more socially-acceptable; if 
not, the unfairness is more personal or “subjective,” and the resulting feeling is more akin 
to “invidious resentment” (Hoogland et al., in press; Smith & Kim, 2007; Smith, Parrott, 
Ozer, & Moniz, 1994). By incorporating “invidious resentment” as a part of envy, envy so 
defined includes the subjective sense of injustice necessary for envy to take on its 
prototypical, hostile form (Smith & Kim, 2007; Smith et al., 1994) without precluding the 
possibility of “pure” resentment, or resentment unalloyed with feelings of envy. Finally, 
and more simply, finding conservative-liberal differences on not just envy but also 
resentment of different sorts of wealth would suggest a more central role for fairness 
judgments in driving ideology-based differences in reactions to wealth.  
Examining the roles of anger and moral disgust. Likely because of its close 
linkage with unfairness appraisals, anger is often experienced in morally-relevant 
situations (Batson et al., 2007), and anger often co-occurs with other negative emotions, 
such as resentment, which is itself a form of anger. Considering liberals often react more 
negatively to inequality than conservatives, anger is an emotion particularly relevant to the 
study of differences between liberals and conservatives in reactions to wealth. Perceived 
unfair treatment is a prototypical appraisal in the experience of anger (Frijda, Kuipers, & 
ter Schure, 1989), although, strictly speaking, unfairness appraisals are not necessary to 
experience anger (Berkowitz, 1990; Berkowitz & Harmon-Jones, 2004; Izard, 1993). 
Anger varies in intensity on the basis of various appraisals, including judgments that the 
anger-eliciting actions were intentional, preventable, or unfair (Darley & Pittman, 2003; 
Fernandez & Turk, 1995; Frijda et al., 1989). Because anger can occur in the absence of a 
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perceived injustice or other moral violations, in this study, it was measured separately  
from related constructs, such as resentment. 
Moral disgust is another possible response to wealthy people that could depend on 
both contextual factors and political ideology. This is because it is a reaction to perceived 
moral violations, such as unfair treatment (Chapman, Kim, Susskind, & Anderson, 2009; 
Chapman & Anderson, 2014; Clark & Fessler, 2015; Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 
1999). Although frequently experienced simultaneously with anger, and sometimes even 
used as a synonym for anger, moral disgust is not identical to anger (Chapman & 
Anderson, 2013, 2014), and may have an even stronger relationship with perceived 
unfairness than anger (Chapman et al., 2009).  
Although no research before the current study has examined moral disgust in 
response to particular wealthy people, mounting empirical evidence suggests that political 
affiliation may influence moral disgust across a variety of situations. For example, 
research has repeatedly linked conservatism with greater disgust sensitivity (e.g., Hodson, 
& Costello, 2007; Inbar, Pizarro, & Bloom, 2009; Inbar, Pizzaro, Iyer, & Haidt, 2012), 
and disgust sensitivity with harsher moral judgments and negative attitudes toward 
stigmatized groups, such as gay people and immigrants (Hodson & Costello, 2007; Inbar, 
Pizarro, Knobe, & Bloom, 2009; Schnall, Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, 2008).  
Given the complex pattern of findings on links among conservatism, moral 
judgments, and disgust, it is difficult to predict whether liberals or conservatives should be 
more prone to feeling moral disgust toward wealthy people, whether overall or only in 
response to specific kinds of wealthy people. On the one hand, conservatives are more 
disgust-prone, and disgust may amplify moral condemnation of perceived unfairness. On 
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the other, conservatives are less likely than liberals to perceive inequality as morally 
wrong or unfair in the first place.  
Contextual Factors in Reactions to Wealth  
 A primary challenge to examining emotional reactions to great wealth is that there 
are undoubtedly any number of contextual factors crucial to predicting emotional reactions 
to particular cases of great wealth. This is bound to be true regardless of the political 
leanings of the beholder, although such leanings could well moderate the impact of those 
factors. Thus, the question is not whether liberals envy those with great wealth, but rather 
what types of great wealth engender envy and what types engender resentment—or both. 
Furthermore, it may be that some types of great wealth produce envy in both liberals and 
conservatives and other types produce similar amounts of resentment. One of the main 
goals of the present research was to systematically examine aspects of great wealth that 
should reveal both similarities and differences in how liberals and conservatives might 
react to such wealth. Doing so would not only recast the possibly simplistic question of 
whether liberals are more envious than conservatives, but also help in understanding when 
differences in their emotional reactions might be more envy-based or resentment-based.  
 Initial source of wealth: Inherited or earned through hard work. One 
especially important contextual factor may be how a wealthy person became wealthy in 
the first place. The wealth may have come in the form of an easily-obtained gift from 
family (e.g., an inheritance), or it instead might have been earned through years of hard 
work. That is, the person’s initial wealth may signify either unearned privilege or 
something closer to an up-by-the-bootstraps, rags-to-riches story. The issue here is that the 
perception of great wealth is likely affected by whether it is perceived to be “deserved” or 
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not. This is not a trivial distinction. Basic social psychological research indicates that 
perceived personal responsibility for an outcome is a key determinant of the perceived 
deservedness (or fairness) of that outcome (Feather, 1999), as well as emotional reactions 
to that outcome (Feather, 2006; van Dijk, Goslinga, & Ouwerkerk, 2008). For example, 
according to Feather’s (2006, 2012) deservingness theory, resentment is likely to result 
when another person experiences an undeserved positive outcome, and joy (or 
schadenfreude) may occur when that person loses the undeserved positive outcome—
either way, a sense of justice and “balance” between the other person’s actions and 
outcomes is restored (Feather, 2006; 2012; Heider, 1958; van Dijk, Ouwerkerk, & 
Goslinga, 2009). Furthermore, the literature on fairness and justice perceptions suggests 
that the process by which the distribution of resources was determined, or procedural 
justice, generally impacts evaluations of wealth to an even greater extent than distributive 
justice, or the overall distribution of resources (Tyler, 2011). Thus, because a wealthy 
person who inherited his or her wealth would not be seen as responsible for and therefore 
deserving of it, that wealth would be perceived as less fair than wealth gained more slowly 
through great effort.  
 In the present study, participants reacted to examples of great wealth that was 
either inherited or “earned” through hard work. This manipulation had a number of 
possible benefits for the research questions at hand. First, one might predict that, 
regardless of political ideology, inherited wealth would produce more envy than earned 
wealth. However, this pattern might be especially pronounced for liberals compared to 
conservatives. Possibly, liberals would have equal and low amounts of envy in reaction to 
earned wealth; inherited wealth would be where liberals part company with conservatives. 
 
16 
 
But this pattern, even if it emerged, would be only half the story. Liberals might also 
perceive the inherited wealth to be “objectively” less fair than would conservatives, 
thereby increasing resentment.  
The nature of liberal and conservative ideology also suggests a complex picture. 
For example, the literature on just-world beliefs and system-justifying ideologies suggests 
that conservatives generally perceive greater procedural justice in the society-wide process 
of wealth allocation than liberals (Jost, 2006; Jost & Hunyady, 2005; Lerner, 1980). 
Simply put, the economic “system” often seems less “rigged” to conservatives than 
liberals.6 Conservatives should therefore be more likely to assume that a specific wealthy 
person deserves his or her wealth (even if much of it were inherited), at least in the 
absence of clear evidence that it was ill-gotten. If so, envy (and resentment) should be low 
across the board for conservatives. Additional literature suggests that although liberals and 
conservatives alike are concerned about procedural economic justice (e.g., equal 
opportunity to succeed in America’s relatively free-market economy), liberals place a 
substantially greater emphasis on distributive justice (e.g., equality of outcomes) than 
conservatives (Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2013). If so, envy (and resentment) should be 
relatively high across the board for liberals. 
In any event, manipulating the source of the target’s great wealth had the potential 
to aid in better understanding how this key contextual factor might affect reactions in 
general and also reveal the particular concerns of liberals and conservatives. Not only 
                                                 
6 The improbable rise of populist Republican presidential candidate Donald J. Trump, who frequently and 
publically has complained of US trade agreements that are stacked against average Americans by a self-
enriching political and economic elite, suggests that large numbers of people across the political spectrum 
may view the current socioeconomic order in the US as fundamentally unjust. Even so, the extent to which 
ideologically “pure” conservatives, rather than dissatisfied current or former liberals, concur with Trump’s 
statements on the economy (e.g., on free trade and outsourcing) is unclear. 
 
17 
 
could the separate reactions of envy and resentment be examined, but the way in which 
these two emotions relate to one another in each context could be addressed. For example, 
would the source of wealth source influence both envy and resentment among liberals and 
conservatives alike? Further, could wealth source influence the strength of the relationship 
between political ideology and one or both of these emotions?  
It should also be emphasized that this distinction between inherited and earned 
wealth dovetails with many common examples in everyday life that appear to capture how 
people differentially react to great wealth in general and as a function of political leanings 
(e.g., popular perceptions of “privileged” heirs vs. equally-wealthy, self-made 
businesspeople). Furthermore, as suggested already, the social psychological variables 
underlying possible differences between liberals and conservatives in their reactions to 
inherited and earned wealth represent longstanding theoretical and empirical traditions. 
Harmfulness of actions related to wealth: Not harmful or harmful. Emotional 
reactions to wealthy people should be influenced by the perceived source of their wealth, 
but another factor suggested by empirical literature (especially on moral judgments; 
Schein & Gray, 2015; Schein, Ritter, & Gray, in press) and the current political debates 
over concentrated wealth and inequality may play an even more influential role. 
Specifically, whether a rich person actively harmed less fortunate people in the pursuit of 
greater wealth may be a stronger determinant of reactions to her wealth than how she 
became wealthy in the first place. For example, a very well-heeled person might acquire a 
company and lay people off in order to reap large profits, or, alternatively, he might earn 
those same profits in ways that do not hurt workers. Per deservingness and balance 
theories, a harm-doer’s wealth itself may be seen as unfair or unjust because “bad” people 
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deserve congruent, “bad” outcomes (Feather, 2006; 2012; Heider, 1958). The harmful 
actions are also very likely to be seen as at least somewhat procedurally unjust, and, as 
mentioned, perceived procedural injustice engenders anger and resentment in response to 
inequality. Moreover, psychological perspectives on moral judgment often emphasize the 
role of perceived harm when people make judgments of right and wrong (e.g., Haidt, 
2012, 2015). For example, Haidt’s popular book Righteous Minds (2012; Chapter 7) cites 
harming others while personally profiting as a straightforward example of violating the 
rules and principles of fairness, and empirical research on reactions to unfair treatment has 
sometimes involved gauging how people react to another’s “unfairly” profiting at their 
expense by deviating from an equitable, 50/50 division of resources (e.g., Chapman et al., 
2009). Although matters of procedural justice and deservingness perceptions are likely at 
play (as with the manipulation of wealth source), manipulating harmfulness may be a 
uniquely powerful way of increasing envy and resentment of wealthy people, as some 
researchers have posited that judgments of harmfulness comprise the cardinal factor in 
judgments of the morality and fairness of actions; in such a view, fairness judgments about 
actions are modulated by the perceived degree of harm caused by those actions (e.g., Gray, 
Waytz, & Young, 2012; Schein et al., in press; Schein & Gray, 2012). Given all this, a 
major advantage of manipulating the harmfulness of actions taken in the pursuit of wealth 
is that harmful actions can be expected to increase unfavorable reactions among people 
across the entire political spectrum.  
Harming others to obtain more wealth violates many people’s ideas of procedural 
justice, and the harm caused by those actions in and of itself should lead to unfairness 
judgments and moral condemnation. There would therefore seem to be an appreciable risk 
 
19 
 
that harmfulness may “engulf the field,” in the sense that it might eliminate any possibility 
of envy and/or resentment varying as a function of political ideology. Previous empirical 
research, however, suggests that is not the case. Both liberals’ and conservatives’ 
judgments of morality may be made on the basis of perceived harm and fairness, but these 
“moral foundations” are even more important to liberals than conservatives (Graham, 
Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Graham, Nosek, Haidt, Iyer, Koleva, & Ditto, 2011; Haidt, 2012). 
Moreover, research on system justification and rationalization of inequality suggests that 
conservatives should perceive self-enriching actions with negative economic 
consequences for others to be more fair, and perhaps less harmful, than liberals (Jost & 
Hunyady, 2003; 2005). This suggests that harmfulness should have even stronger effects 
on envy and resentment among liberals than conservatives. To summarize, when a 
wealthy person (at least seemingly) does no harm in the pursuit of wealth, both liberals 
and conservatives might be expected to have relatively low levels of envy and resentment 
of him or her, while clear harm-doing might enhance liberals’ envy and resentment to an 
even stronger extent than for conservatives. 
Clearly, personally-enriching, intentional acts that hurt other people are more 
likely to be seen as unfair, ceteris paribus. However, political ideology may influence 
reactions not only to wealthy people who have harmed others in the pursuit of wealth, but 
also to wealthy people whose equally-lucrative business decisions did no apparent harm. 
Due largely to distributive justice concerns and, possibly, less favorable views of wealthy 
people in general, liberals might well experience somewhat stronger envious and/or 
resentful feelings toward wealthy people who have done no apparent harm than 
conservatives. 
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Before considering examples of wealthy people whose source of wealth and 
actions varied widely (specifically, US presidents and presidential candidates), it should 
be emphasized that the similar predictions often made on envy and resentment in this 
study do not imply that they are considered synonymous or interchangeable. Envy of 
harm-doing wealthy people might be higher among liberals because they might see such 
actions as unfair in a relatively personal, subjective sense (e.g., “That may be how some 
people think the economy is ‘supposed’ to work, but I still do not agree with it”). 
Resentment might also be higher among liberals because they should be more likely to see 
harmful actions as “objectively” unfair (e.g., “Anyone would agree that hurting people for 
personal gain is morally wrong”) than conservatives, who are more likely to endorse 
economic system-justifying ideologies. It should be noted that (un)fairness judgments 
themselves are not envy or resentment, although they can be important antecedents to (or 
even consequences of) those and other emotions, including anger and moral disgust. There 
is substantial overlap among concepts such as envy, resentment, and fairness, but, as 
suggested, these concepts are considered separately to the extent possible. 
Crossing the manipulations. Examples from United States electoral history 
illustrate that the ways in which wealthy individuals came to be wealthy, and the 
consequences for others of their subsequent actions, can significantly influence how other 
people react to them. First, part of President Andrew Jackson’s appeal to early 19th-
century Americans was the perception that he rose to wealth and influence through merit 
despite beginning life in poverty, and Jackson’s campaign platform and actions while 
president led him to be perceived as more of a populist than a plutocrat (UShistory.org).7 
                                                 
7 Ironically, Jackson had a reputation as a self-made man despite his immensely profitable use of slave labor, 
which was the primary source of his wealth (Escobedo, 2016). 
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However, even candidates from very privileged backgrounds are not necessarily viewed 
negatively for their wealth. The very wealthy, patrician Franklin D. Roosevelt won 4 
presidential elections, in no small part due to his expressed—and often realized—
intentions to use government to help people less fortunate than he and his fellow upper 
class Americans. Decades later, however, another politician born into wealth saw his 
presidential hopes dashed, in part, by portrayals of him as a self-interested harm-doer. 
During the 2012 election season, Mitt Romney’s candidacy was damaged by allegations 
that he unfairly profited by acquiring companies and laying people off during his tenure at 
Bain Capital (e.g., Taibbi, 2012). Empirical research and these examples from US 
presidential politics suggest that, while still influential, whether or not wealthy people 
were born into privilege may play a lesser role in overall reactions to them than the 
harmful or beneficial consequences of their subsequent choices for others.8  
As shown above, psychological literature and historical examples suggest that the 
source of wealthy people’s initial fortune and the potentially-harmful consequences for 
others of their personally-enriching actions should influence others’ fairness judgments 
and emotional reactions to them. Experimentally manipulating these factors may therefore 
be an especially suitable way to investigate the central questions of the current research, 
including the extent to which context impacts liberals’ and conservatives’ reactions to 
wealthy people. One of the most important reasons I opted for the current design is that it 
                                                 
8 Although not a focus of the current study, perceived similarity to and resulting “affirmative” identification 
with non-wealthy people (e.g., “I am an ‘average person’”) might be yet another factor at play in reactions to 
wealthy people (Hogg & Turner, 1985). Negational identification, or defining one’s group in terms of what 
it is not, could also have a role (e.g., “As a fellow ‘average person,’ I am not one of them [i.e., a member of 
the American upper class]) (Zhong, Galinsky, & Unzueta, 2008). The negational identification process 
might be especially likely when other “average people” have been harmed by a wealthy person’s actions. In 
such circumstances, increased identification with the victims, through affirmative and/or negational 
processes, should increase empathy for them and anger toward the wealthy person responsible for their 
plight (Allport, 1954; Brewer, 1999). 
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allowed for a test of both conservative and liberal lay theories regarding the origins of 
opposition to wealth. For example, if liberals respond with more envy across contexts and 
justice/fairness concerns do not mediate that relationship, then there would be a degree of 
support for conservative critics’ accusations that liberal opposition to concentrated wealth 
is based in envy, rather than differences in legitimate, unselfish justice concerns that may 
accompany and help explain such envy.  
A final advantage of the current design is that it focuses on reactions to 
individuated wealthy people, rather than as a stereotyped group. The people at the top of 
America’s income spectrum range from widely-disliked “vulture capitalists” to vaunted 
Silicon Valley “angel investors” (Loewenstein, 2013). With this design, one can begin to 
investigate the extent to which key contextual factors impact ideology-based differences in 
reactions to the diverse group of people sometimes collectively known as “the rich.”  
Overview 
The current study aims to address the following primary questions: (1) Are liberals 
generally more envious than conservatives?, (2) To what extent are liberals’ and 
conservatives’ reactions to wealthy people and their behaviors influenced by (a) the source 
of their initial wealth, and (b) the consequences for others of their personally-enriching 
actions? Or, more broadly, to what extent does context matter to reactions to wealth 
among liberals and conservatives?, and (3) Are any differences between liberals and 
conservatives on envy in response to wealthy people explained by fairness/justice 
concerns?  
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Design Overview 
Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) and University of Kentucky (UKY) 
undergraduate participants read and reacted to two articles from a fictitious investment 
news website detailing interviews with ostensibly-real, wealthy businessmen. In 
counterbalanced order, participants responded to both Gary Taylor, who acquired a ball 
bearing plant in Ohio, and Andy Simmons, who acquired a hubcap factory in Kansas. 
Each entrepreneur either received a large monetary gift from family to start his business or 
worked hard for the money to start it. In the pursuit of further wealth, each entrepreneur 
either harmed workers at the company he acquired (via layoffs and benefits cuts, e.g.), or 
did not. Thus, the study had a 2 (Company/Entrepreneur: ball bearings company/Taylor or 
hubcap company/Simmons) X 2 (Initial Wealth Source: Inherited or Hard Work) X 2 
(Harmfulness of Actions: Not Harmful or Harmful) mixed factorial experimental design 
(Appendix A). The within-participants “Company/Entrepreneur” factor was included for 
purposes of internal replication (Smith & Harris, 2006) and was expected and found to be 
unimportant to key outcomes, as described in Results. After indicating their reactions to 
the articles, participants responded to a series of individual differences questionnaires, 
including one on their political ideology. Political Ideology (or, alternatively, 
“Liberalism”) represented another independent variable, albeit an observed, continuous, 
quasi-experimental one. As appropriate, Political Ideology’s effects were examined jointly 
with the experimental manipulations. Thus, averaging participants’ responses across the 
Company/Entrepreneur factor yielded a final, 2 (Source) X 2 (Harmful Actions) X 
continuous (Political Ideology) between-participants design. 
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Hypotheses9 
Hypotheses were derived and tested. Simplified, brief rationales are provided for 
each hypothesis. 
Political Ideology and envy. When another has self-relevant advantages10 (Tesser, 
1988; Tesser, Millar, & Moore, 1988) that are judged to be unfair, envy often results (van 
de Ven et al., 2015). In general, liberals tend to view the unequal distribution of wealth as 
both objectively and subjectively less fair than do conservatives. On this basis, I predicted 
there would be a positive correlation between political liberalism and state envy of the 
wealthy entrepreneurs. I also expected a perhaps weaker positive correlation between 
political liberalism and dispositional envy, as conservatives have a greater tendency 
toward seeing the state of the world, including their own deserts, as fair (e.g., Schlenker, 
Chambers, & Le, 2012).  
Predicted effects of context and Political Ideology on envy and resentment. 
Because of the close conceptual links between envy and resentment, I made the same 
predictions about context and Political Ideology effects on resentment as envy, with the 
exception of the Hard Work X Not Harmful condition, as explained below. For purposes 
of brevity and clarity, hypotheses on “envy/resentment” are written together where 
possible.  
Both liberals and conservatives value the proportionality of economic inputs and 
outputs as a basis for judging economic fairness. On this basis, I predicted a main effect of 
                                                 
9 For purposes of clarity, hypotheses are stated as though the liberal-conservative spectrum were 
dichotomized, but in reality, political ideology was measured and analyzed as a continuous variable (Cohen, 
Cohen, West, and Aiken, 2003). 
10 In the US and elsewhere, these attributes generally will include financial and professional success. 
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Source on envy/resentment whereby more envy/resentment would be reported in the 
Inherited condition than in the Hard Work condition.  
Harming others in the pursuit of wealth should seem unfair to most people across 
the political spectrum. On this basis, I predicted a main effect of Harmful Actions on 
envy/resentment whereby more envy/resentment would be reported in the Harmful 
condition than in the Not Harmful condition. 
Liberals view the unequal distribution of wealth to be more unfair than do 
conservatives, whereas conservatives tend to view concentrated wealth as relatively fair 
unless the possessor’s outcomes seem disproportionate to his or her inputs. Given this and 
empirical research suggesting that a subjective sense of unfairness is necessary for envy, 
and that liberals may be more prone to perceiving concentrated wealth as inherently and 
“objectively” unfair, I predicted a main effect of Political Ideology on envy/resentment 
whereby liberals would report greater envy/resentment than would conservatives in 
response to wealthy entrepreneurs.  
Liberals tend to be more concerned about equality of opportunity than 
conservatives when making judgments about the procedural justice or fairness of another’s 
outcome. On this basis, I predicted a two-way Source X Political Ideology interaction, 
whereby the enhancing effect of Inherited wealth on envy/resentment would be more 
pronounced among liberals than conservatives. 
To an even greater extent than conservatives, liberals tend to morally evaluate 
actions on the basis of how harmful and/or unfair they perceive them to be. Conservatives 
often make harsher moral judgments than liberals, but given their tendency to rationalize 
“collateral damage” in the current entrepreneurial capitalist system of the United States 
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(e.g., Jost & Hunyady, 2005), that tendency to judge perceived transgressions more 
harshly may be somewhat muted when judging wealthy businesspeople. That is, due to 
economic system-justifying ideologies, conservatives may see business decisions that 
boost personal wealth at the expense of workers as less unfair than liberals, and therefore 
less worthy of their typically-harsher moral condemnation. Despite these complexities, I 
tentatively predicted a two-way Harmful Actions X Political Ideology interaction whereby 
the enhancing effect of Harmful actions on envy/resentment would be more pronounced 
among liberals than conservatives. 
Because of differences in distributive justice concerns, I particularly expected 
liberals to experience more envy than conservatives in the Hard Work X Not Harmful 
condition, as that condition gave no readily apparent, “objective” reason that the 
entrepreneur’s wealth was unfair. In contrast, I had no specific prediction for whether 
liberals and conservatives would differ in resentment within the Hard Work X Not 
Harmful condition. As shown in Figure 1, my predictions on envy in the Hard Work X 
Not Harmful condition implied a simple effect of Political Ideology, such that liberals (+1 
SD on political liberalism) would express greater envy in the Hard Work X Not Harmful 
condition than would conservatives (-1 SD on political liberalism).  
Other contextual effects on emotional reactions to wealth. Perceived harm as a 
result of intentional actions should increase anger toward the actor. On this basis, I 
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Figure 1: Predicted Effects of Source and Harmful Actions on Envy by Political Ideology 
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predicted greater anger in the Harmful condition than in the Not Harmful condition. Moral 
disgust is perhaps even more strongly linked to perceived unfairness than anger, and 
should therefore be enhanced when others (a) unfairly profit at the cost of others and (b) 
have unfair advantages in life. On this basis, I predicted greater moral disgust in the 
Harmful condition than in the Not Harmful condition, and greater moral disgust in the 
Inherited condition than in the Hard Work condition. 
Predicted process effects. I conducted mediation and moderated mediation tests 
in order to examine why and when liberals and conservatives might respond differently 
when presented with wealthy people. These analyses focused on three key topics in the 
current study, including political ideology, fairness perceptions, and envy. 
Conservatives more strongly endorse economic system-justifying ideologies than 
liberals, and justifying a wealthy entrepreneur’s actions (whether harmful to others or not) 
should make them seem fairer. On this basis, I predicted mediation of the effect of 
Political Ideology on the perceived fairness of the entrepreneur’s actions via a composite 
measure of justifying statements (e.g., “Simmons’ actions were good for the overall 
economy”). 
The predicted moderation by Political Ideology of the effect of Source on envy 
was predicated on the assumption that Liberalism would (1) enhance the effect of 
Inherited wealth on envy, and (2) moderate the degree to which Inherited wealth would 
lead the entrepreneur’s initial wealth source to be perceived as less fair than wealth earned 
through Hard Work. On this basis, I predicted a first stage and direct effect moderation 
model, in which Political Ideology moderates both the direct effect of Source on envy and 
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the indirect effect of Source on envy via the perceived fairness of the initial wealth source 
(Figure 2).11 
The predicted moderation by Political Ideology of the effect of harm on envy was 
predicated on the assumptions that Liberalism would (1) enhance the effect of Harmful 
actions on envy, and (2) moderate the degree to which Harmful actions would lead the 
entrepreneur’s actions to be perceived as less fair. On this basis, I predicted a first stage 
and direct effect moderation model (Edwards & Lambert, 2007; Hayes, 2015; Preacher, 
Rucker, & Hayes, 2007), in which Political Ideology would moderate both the direct 
effect of Harmful Actions on envy and the indirect effect of Harmful Actions on envy via 
the perceived fairness of the entrepreneur’s actions (Figure 3).12  
Exploratory analyses. I tested whether the effect of Political Ideology on the 
perceived fairness of a wealthy entrepreneur’s actions would be mediated via the 
perceived harmfulness of those actions, as suggested by proponents of dyadic morality 
theory (DMT) (Gray & Schein, 2012; Schein & Gray, 2015). I collapsed across 
experimental condition for that analysis, as the goal was to investigate in a preliminary 
way whether left-right differences in moral judgments of wealthy people can be traced to 
their different perceptions of how harmful a wealthy person’s behavior is likely to be. 
  
                                                 
11 I did not predict that the pathway between the mediator (fairness of the entrepreneur’s initial wealth 
source) and the outcome (envy) would be moderated by Political Ideology. Although Liberalism should 
impact the extent to which Inherited wealth (as opposed to Hard Work) decreases the perceived fairness of 
that source of wealth, there was little reason to believe that the effect of such fairness judgments on envy, 
once made, would be moderated by Political Ideology. In path-analytic terms, I predicted moderation of the 
“a” path, but not the “b” path, in Figure 2 (see Baron & Kenny, 1986, p. 1176). 
12 Paralleling the previously-described process model on Source and envy, I did not predict that the pathway 
between the mediator (fairness of the entrepreneur’s actions) and the outcome (envy) would be moderated 
by Political Ideology—although Liberalism should impact the extent to which Harmful actions decrease the 
perceived fairness of those actions, there was little reason to believe that the effect of such fairness 
judgments on envy, once made, would be moderated by Political Ideology. In short, I predicted moderation 
of the “a” path, but not the “b” path, in Figure 3. 
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Figure 2: Hypothesized First Stage and Direct Effect Moderation Model: Moderation by 
Political Ideology of Direct Effect of Source on Envy and Indirect Effect of Source on 
Envy via Perceived Fairness of Entrepreneur’s Initial Source of Wealth 
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Figure 3: Hypothesized First Stage and Direct Effect Moderation Model: Moderation by 
Political Ideology of Direct Effect of Harmful Actions on Envy and Indirect Effect of 
Harmful Actions on Envy via Perceived Fairness of Entrepreneur’s Actions   
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I also investigated whether envy varies as a function of subjective socioeconomic 
status (SES) among liberals but not conservatives. Napier and Jost (2008) found that 
socioeconomically disadvantaged and advantaged people do not differ in the palliative 
effect of system-justifying beliefs on (un)happiness. Accordingly, because conservatives 
also endorse system-justifying beliefs more strongly than liberals (Jost et al., 2003a; 
Napier & Jost, 2008), they could feel less envy across the board than liberals. However, if 
the envy-based, conservative account of liberal opposition to concentrated wealth is 
correct, subjective SES and ideology might have interactive effects on envy in response to 
a wealthy person—low SES liberals should feel more envy than high SES liberals, 
whereas conservatives should feel similarly low levels of envy whether low or high in 
SES. I therefore ran a multiple regression model in which envy was regressed on Political 
Ideology, subjective SES, and their interaction.  
Chapter Two: Method 
Power Analysis  
 The typical effect size in published social psychology research is approximately r 
= .21, or small to medium in magnitude (Richard, Bond, & Stokes-Zoota, 2003); given 
this, and the small to medium effect sizes frequently observed in the pilot research, a 
priori power analyses were conducted assuming small to medium effect sizes (d = .35; r = 
.20; f2 = .085; Murphy & Myors, 2004). To detect an association of r = .20 (e.g., between 
political liberalism and envy), 95% power required N = 319, assuming α = .05 (two-
tailed); with these same parameters, 80% power would require N = 193 
(https://www.statstodo.com/SSizCorr_Pgm.php). For tests of the effect of a two-level 
independent variable, N = 201 for 95% power and N = 121 for 80% power 
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(http://powerandsamplesize.com/Calculators/Compare-2-Means/2-Sample-Equality). The 
required sample size to detect mediation with 80% power using the bias-corrected 
bootstrap mediation method is N = 400, assuming an “a” path medium in magnitude (e.g., 
the anticipated effect of Political Ideology on fairness judgments), and a “b” path small in 
magnitude (Fritz & MacKinnon, 2007, Table 3). 
To calculate the sample sizes necessary for 80% power and 95% power for the 
predicted three-way interaction on envy, I used G*Power version 3.1.9.2 (Faul, Erdfelder, 
Buchner, & Lang, 2009). I estimated the increment in R2 as a result of adding the three-
way interaction to the envy model to be .01 (f2 = .0101).13 For 80% power to detect the 
predicted 3-way interaction with an increment in R2 of .01, 779 participants would be 
necessary; 1,289 would be necessary for 95% power.  
In past online research using mild deception similar to the deception employed in 
this study (i.e., misleading people to believe that fabricated articles were genuine), 
approximately 25% of participants either failed one or more attention checks or expressed 
suspicion regarding the researcher-constructed articles. Given the statistical and 
methodological characteristics of the proposed study (as described above), target N was 
                                                 
13 Perhaps counterintuitively, an obtained increment in R2 of .01 arguably should not be considered 
negligible when one or more continuous, observed independent variables is involved. In a review article 
explaining the greater difficulty of detecting interactions involving at least 1 continuous, observed 
independent variable, compared to detecting interactions only involving experimentally-manipulated 
independent variables, McClelland and Judd (1993) concluded that “It is not appropriate to dismiss a 1% 
interaction found in the field because, as this example [of a continuous X continuous interaction discussed in 
the article] shows, it is equivalent to an interaction reducing error 21.7% in an optimal design [i.e., a design 
involving only experimentally-manipulated independent variables]” (p. 384). To be clear, such a large 
“equivalent” reduction in error for the current study was not expected. 
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1,000 (~800 for 80% power, plus 200 [25%] more participants to make up for anticipated 
attrition).14  
Participant Recruitment 
 Six hundred sixty-seven participants of varying socioeconomic and ethnic 
backgrounds were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (or MTurk) service. 
Mechanical Turk is a popular resource for recruiting participants for social science 
research, as it allows researchers to quickly and inexpensively obtain data of similar 
quality to data collected from convenience samples of undergraduate psychology students, 
who tend to be less sociodemographically diverse (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; 
Huff & Tingley, 2015; Paolacci & Chandler, 2014). In this approximately 25 minute-long 
study, MTurk participants were paid 50 cents each for their participation; research 
indicates that even substantially lower per-minute compensation rates have little impact on 
the quality of the data MTurk participants provide (Buhrmester et al., 2011). 
In addition to the MTurk sample, 321 participants were recruited from the UKY 
Psychology participant pool. Data from an online mass-testing (MT) questionnaire 
administered approximately 8 to 10 weeks prior to the study were available on (1) political 
ideology, (2) dispositional envy, and (3) dispositional benign envy for 137 UKY 
participants. Another 11 UKY participants had MT data available on only the dispositional 
envy and dispositional benign envy scales. Both MTurk and UKY participants completed 
the study online. Unless otherwise noted, all results are based on combined MTurk and 
UKY data.  
                                                 
14 Given budgetary and time constraints that made it unlikely to obtain a sample with 95% power to detect 
the three-way interaction (1,289 X 1.25 = 1,611), the target was set at 80% power, which traditionally has 
been considered an acceptable level of power in social psychological research (Cohen et al., 2003).  
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Stimulus Articles 
 A total of eight stimulus articles were constructed to appear as though they were 
from a business website (Appendix B15). 
Company/Entrepreneur manipulation. Participants read about a male 
businessperson, “Gary Taylor,” who either harmed or did not harm workers in pursuit of 
wealth, and either received his initial wealth as a gift from family or through hard work. 
For purposes of internal replication, another businessperson, “Andy Simmons,” was also 
described. Within each of the four conditions, storylines for both businesspeople were 
similar, aside from superficial details which were changed to prevent the articles from 
being too similar to be believable. For example, the company that each entrepreneur 
acquired was in a different US state and manufactured a different product. Only a handful 
of participants noted that the articles they read seemed similar to them; thus, efforts to 
make the articles seem sufficiently different from one another appear to have been 
successful.  
(Initial Wealth) Source manipulation. The entrepreneur was presented as either 
having been gifted his wealth or having earned it through long-term, sustained effort. For 
example, in the Inherited condition, Gary Taylor’s backstory was described as follows: 
“After Taylor graduated college at the age of twenty-one with a degree in 
economics, he started working at his father’s investment management firm. The 
key to the sudden take off of Taylor’s career, however, was his determination to 
acquire struggling businesses, and to make sizeable profits by selling them. With 
                                                 
15 Care was taken to make the articles appear as authentic as possible. No copyediting marks (e.g., wavy 
underlining) were present in the articles posted online, and few expressed the suspicion that the articles were 
constructed by the researcher, or “fake.” 
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the help of a multimillion dollar gift from his ‘well-to-do’ family, he quit his job 
and started looking for a company to acquire at the ripe old age of 25.” 
 In the Hard Work condition, however, Taylor’s rise was described as a function of 
hard work and wise investment: 
“When Taylor graduated college at the age of twenty-one, he set off for the 
corporate world with little more than a degree in economics and the shirt on his 
back. He worked very hard at his post-college investment management job, saving 
his money and making strategic stock purchases when he could. The key to the 
sudden take off of Taylor’s career, however, was his determination to acquire 
struggling businesses, and to make sizeable profits by selling them. By combining 
his savings and selling his investments, he had just enough money to quit his job 
and start looking for a company to acquire at the ripe old age of 25.” 
Harmful Actions manipulation. In the Harmful condition, the entrepreneur was 
portrayed as having increased the profitability of his investment in a company in ways that 
decreased the economic well-being of workers. For example, participants read about 
entrepreneur Andy Simmons taking the following actions in the Harmful condition:  
“…he cut over 25% of the workers at the factory, and replaced them with cheaper 
hires when necessary,” and “He eliminated the health insurance plans and the 
401K program for all new hires, and reduced 401K matching for current 
employees by 67%.”  
 In contrast, the entrepreneur in the Not Harmful condition increased the value of 
his investment to an equal extent without harming workers in the process. To illustrate, in 
the Not Harmful condition, Andy Simmons “increased the factory workers’ output with 
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the help of productivity experts that he personally interviewed and hired, and designed a 
new financial plan for the company.” 
Questionnaires following Stimulus Articles 
 Following each article, participants responded to a 37-item questionnaire 
(Appendix C). Responses were on a Likert-type scale ranging from 0 (disagree 
completely) to 6 (agree completely). Five items included as fillers to reduce suspicion 
(e.g., “[Entrepreneur] is a great role model”) were not analyzed. 
Envy. Five items were adapted from van de Ven et al. (2015) and averaged to 
create a composite measure of envy (α = .83), including “I am a little jealous16 of 
[Entrepreneur’s] wealth;” “It is frustrating that [Entrepreneur] is better off than I am;” “I 
hope [Entrepreneur] suffers a serious financial setback;” “I wish [Entrepreneur] weren’t so 
successful;” and “I can’t help but resent [Entrepreneur] for his success.” Although not of 
central interest to the current research, “benign envy” was measured with a different set of 
five items adapted from van de Ven (2015), including “I am a little envious of 
[Entrepreneur]’s wealth;” “I want to have [Entrepreneur’s] wealth as well;” “I feel 
inspired to get wealth myself;” “I think about what it would be like to have 
[Entrepreneur’s] wealth;” and “I want to put in effort to obtain wealth myself.” The items 
were averaged to create a composite measure of benign envy (α = .89).  
Resentment, anger, and moral disgust. Two items were included as measures of 
resentment (“I resent [Entrepreneur’s] actions/wealth”) (α = .80). Two items apiece were 
                                                 
16 In English, the terms “envy” and “jealousy” are often used interchangeably. In the psychological 
literature, however, envy and jealousy are treated as distinct constructs. Specifically, jealousy is a varying 
set of threatening thoughts, feelings, and action tendencies following a realization that one might lose a 
valued other (e.g., a romantic partner) to another person (e.g., a rival suitor)—an inherently three-person 
situation (Parrott, 1991; Parrott & Smith, 1993). 
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also included to measure anger (“[Entrepreneur’s] actions/wealth make[s] me angry.”) (α 
= .84) and moral disgust ([Entrepreneur’s] actions/wealth were/is disgusting.) (α = .88). 
Manipulation checks and perceived fairness. Two items served as a 
manipulation check for Source (“[Entrepreneur’s] initial wealth was earned through hard 
work;” and “[Entrepreneur’s] initial wealth was given to him by family”) (α = .92) and 
two items served as a manipulation check for Harmful Actions (“[Entrepreneur] harmed 
the workers in the [Kansas/Ohio] company;” “[Entrepreneur] harmed the company in 
[Kansas/Ohio]) (α = .84). Two items measured the perceived fairness of the entrepreneur’s 
source capital (“The way [Entrepreneur] got his initial wealth was fair;” “[Entrepreneur]’s 
source of startup money was fair”) (α = .94), and two items measured the perceived 
fairness of the entrepreneur’s actions (“[Entrepreneur’s] actions were fair;” 
“[Entrepreneur’s] actions with the company were unfair” (R)) (α = .93).  
Economic justifications for actions. Four items measured the extent to which 
participants viewed the entrepreneur’s actions as economically justified or beneficial, 
including “[Entrepreneur’s] actions were good for the overall economy;” “I believe 
[Entrepreneur] helped save the [Kansas/Ohio] company;” “[Entrepreneur] did his duty for 
his investors by taking the actions he did with the Ohio company;” and “[Entrepreneur’s] 
way of turning around companies is good for the country” (α = .91). 
Personal qualities. Two items enabled an exploration of whether political 
ideology might influence perceptions of the entrepreneur’s personal characteristics (e.g., 
lesser endorsement of positive attributes, and greater endorsement of negative attributes), 
and, therefore emotional reactions to them. The first, “[Entrepreneur] is a very skilled 
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businessperson,” gauged the entrepreneur’s perceived competence, while the second, 
“[Entrepreneur] is greedy,” measured perceived greed.  
Individual Differences Measures17 (Appendix D) 
 
Political Ideology. In recent years, “Republican” has become increasingly 
synonymous with conservative political ideology, just as “Democrat” has with liberal 
political ideology (Barber & McCarty, 2015; Levendusky, 2009). In keeping with this 
trend, and other research that has successfully used brief composite measures of political 
ideology (Jost, 2006; Napier & Jost, 2008), I used a composite measure of political 
ideology which combined measures of both ideology proper (i.e., endorsement of 
conservative and liberal political views) and agreement with the conservative (Republican) 
and liberal (Democratic) parties’ positions. This measure was an adaptation of Morgan, 
Mullen, and Skitka’s (2010) measures of political orientation, which included self-
reported liberalism and conservatism, as well as feelings toward Democrats and 
Republicans; the items were subsequently combined to form reliable composite measures 
of political orientation. 
For the current research, political ideology was assessed with four items 
(endpoints: 1 = completely disagree, 7 = completely agree): “I agree with Republicans 
(Democrats) on political issues” and “I am conservative (liberal) in my political views.” 
The “Republican” and “conservative” questions were reverse-scored and averaged with 
the “Democrat” and “liberal” questions to obtain a composite “Liberalism” score (α = 
.92). As mentioned, some participants completed the political ideology measure both as 
                                                 
17 For purposes of an unrelated scale validation project, a 7-item dispositional schadenfreude scale (Krizan & 
Hoogland, manuscript in preparation) was included after all other individual differences questionnaires. This 
likely prevented it from having an appreciable impact on the measures of interest in the current study and it 
will not be discussed further. 
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part of the main study session and 8-10 weeks earlier during MT, at which point the 
measure was embedded among various unrelated questionnaires. Similar to when it was 
administered as part of the main study session, the political ideology scale was also 
reliable when administered during MT (α = .88). Moreover, test-retest reliability was high, 
r(135) = .88, p < .001, indicating considerable stability of political views over the 8-10 
week period between MT and participation in the main study session. Pilot data also 
suggested the validity and reliability of the scale. Specifically, when a 20-item measure of 
right-wing authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1996) was included in the UKY Psychology 
participant pool MT questionnaire, it strongly negatively correlated with this study’s 
measure of Liberalism, r(1,245) = -.58, p < .001. 
Dispositional hostile and benign envy. Dispositional envy was measured using 
both the 8-item DES (Smith et al., 1999; example item: “It is so frustrating to see some 
people succeed so easily”) (α = .91), and the 4-item dispositional malicious envy subscale 
of the BeMaS (Lange & Crusius, 2015; example item: “I feel ill will towards people I 
envy”) (α = .90); as expected, the scale composites were highly correlated, r(797) = .66, p 
< .001. Dispositional benign envy was measured with the 4-item dispositional benign envy 
subscale of the BeMaS (Lange & Crusius, 2015; example item: “If I notice that another 
person is better than me, I try to improve myself”) (α = .90); there is no other validated 
scale for dispositional benign envy at present. Responses to each of the above measures 
were on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree) in order to aid 
comparability of results, and in keeping with the endpoints for the BeMaS used in 
previous research (i.e., Lange & Crusius, 2015). When measured during MT, both the 
dispositional envy (α = .87) and dispositional benign envy (α = .87) scales were high in 
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internal consistency. Test-retest reliabilities were r(146) = .58, p < .001, and r(146) = .55, 
p < .001, respectively. 
Social desirability. Especially because envy is a socially undesirable emotion 
(Powell, Smith, & Schurtz, 2008), I included a 13-item version of the Marlowe-Crowne 
Social Desirability Scale (SDS; Crowne & Marlowe, 1960; Fischer & Fick, 1993; Loo & 
Thorpe, 2000; Reynolds, 1982) (α = .75). Responses were on a scale from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). The SDS correlated with key outcomes, including envy 
r(798) = -.23, p < .001, and liberal political ideology, r(798) = -.09, p = .011. It therefore 
was included as a covariate in regression analyses to control for any influence it might 
have on conservative-liberal differences on the outcomes of interest.  
Subjective SES. Regardless of their actual resource level, people who perceive 
themselves to be relatively low in status tend to be more supportive of redistribution (or 
equality of outcomes) than those who perceive themselves to be high in status, and, 
similarly, subjective socioeconomic status (SES) likely plays a greater role in reactions to 
inequality than objective SES (Brown-Iannuzzi, Lundberg, Kay, & Payne, 2015). In light 
of the link between perceived status and reactions to inequality, subjective SES was 
measured using the ten-rung McArthur Ladder, in which participants placed themselves at 
higher rungs as their perceived standing relative to others in the United States increased 
(Ditto et al., 2013).   
Procedure 
 After signing up online and consenting to participate, participants read 2 target 
articles (randomly presented), each of which was followed by questionnaires with 
response options on a Likert-type scale. Participants then completed the individual 
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differences measures and gave open-ended responses to the suspicion check questions. 
Before exiting the study, participants read a debriefing form, which was followed by an 
opportunity to withhold their data from analysis, in light of the deception employed in the 
experiment.  
Data Preparation 
 Data cleaning. Of the 321 undergraduates who consented to participate, 39 did not 
indicate whether or not they consented for their data to be used; however, all but 3 of them 
provided no answers for questions late in survey, indicating the vast majority of them 
dropped out of the study before completion. Another 7 participants opted to have their 
data excluded from analysis. Thus, 275 undergraduates’ data passed the initial data screen. 
Of the 667 MTurk participants consenting to participate, 49 did not indicate whether or 
not they consented for their data to be used; however, all but 1 of them did not provide 
answers to questions late in survey. One other participant opted to have his or her data 
excluded from analysis. Thus, 617 MTurk participants’ data passed the initial data screen.  
For further data cleaning (and subsequent data analyses), the combined sample was 
examined. A (2 [Sample: MTurk or UKY Undergraduate] X 4 [Experimental Condition]) 
chi-square test of independence confirmed that, within the combined sample, roughly 
equal proportions of participants from each sample were in each experimental condition, 
χ2(3) = .664, p = .88 (Table 1). This indicated that any effects of sample were not 
systematically related to experimental condition and allowed the data from the MTurk and 
UKY samples to be combined.  
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Table 1: Participant Count by Experimental Condition and Sample (Mechanical Turk or 
Undergraduate) 
  Condition   
Sample   
Hard 
Work X 
No Harm 
Inherited 
X No
Harm 
Hard 
Work X 
Harm 
Total 
UKY 
Undergraduates 
Count 47 50 58 52 207 
Expected 
count 50.72 49.42 54.6 52.27 207 
% within 
row 22.7 % 24.2 % 28.0 % 25.1 % 100.0 % 
% within 
column 24.0 % 26.2 % 27.5 % 25.7 % 25.9 % 
% of 
Total 5.9 % 6.3 % 7.2 % 6.5 % 25.9 % 
Mechanical 
Turk Workers 
Count 149 141 153 150 593 
Expected 
count 145.28 141.58 156.4 149.73 593 
% within 
row 25.1 % 23.8 % 25.8 % 25.3 % 100.0 % 
% within 
column 76.0 % 73.8 % 72.5 % 74.3 % 74.1 % 
% of 
Total 18.6 % 17.6 % 19.1 % 18.8 % 74.1 % 
Total 
Count 196 191 211 202 800 
Expected 
count 196 191 211 202 800 
% within 
row 24.5 % 23.9 % 26.4 % 25.3 % 100.0 % 
% within 
column 100.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 % 
% of 
Total 24.5 % 23.9 % 26.4 % 25.3 % 100.0 % 
 
  
X Harm
 Inherited 
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Six participants’ data were excluded from the combined sample because they 
indicated in the open-ended suspicion check questions that they accidentally skipped 
ahead past an article or had technical difficulties (e.g., not seeing one of the stimulus 
articles). Two participants’ data were excluded for providing rather strange answers to 
those questions (“salty people who are jelly;” “us good”), thereby indicating possible 
intoxication and/or not having taken the study seriously. Fifteen participants answered no 
questions about either article; their data was excluded as a result. Twenty-one random 
responders (e.g., participants who answered every Likert-type item in the study with a 
“3”) were also excluded. A final 48 participants’ data were excluded for failing one or 
both attention checks in the study (“This is an attention check. Please choose answer “3” 
for this question”); one attention check was embedded in the questionnaire following each 
of the two target entrepreneurs. In sum, 988 participants consented to participate, and, 
after the data cleaning and exclusion procedures were completed, N = 800 (81%) 
remained. 
Suspicion check and sensitivity analysis. Two questions served as suspicion 
checks in the study (“Do you have any comments about this study?” and “What do you 
think the study was about?”). Responses were open-ended, and based on answers to both 
questions, the overall suspicion of each participant was coded on an ordinal scale as 
follows: 0 = None; 1 = Mild (mentioned envy, resentment, or politics); 2 = Moderate 
(thought articles might have been fake); and 3 = Strong (guessed hypothesis or guessed 
combination of independent variables).  
Approximately 94% of participants expressed no (40%) or only mild (54%) 
suspicion about the study (Table 2). Three percent expressed suspicion over the articles’ 
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Table 2: Suspicion by Experimental Condition 
  
  
Condition 0 1 2 3 Total
Count 91 95 6 10 202
Expected count 80.55 108.3 5.55 7.58 202
% within row 45.0 % 47.0 % 3.0 % 5.0 % 100.0 %
% within 28.5 % 22.1 % 27.3 % 33.3 % 25.3 %  
% of Total 11.4 % 11.9 % 0.8 % 1.3 % 25.3 %
Count 74 120 4 13 211
Expected count 84.14 113.1 5.8 7.91 211
% within row 35.1 % 56.9 % 1.9 % 6.2 % 100.0 %
% within 23.2 % 28.0 % 18.2 % 43.3 % 26.4 %
% of Total 9.3 % 15.0 % 0.5 % 1.6 % 26.4 %
Count 77 103 7 4 191
Expected count 76.16 102.4 5.25 7.16 191
% within row 40.3 % 53.9 % 3.7 % 2.1 % 100.0 %
% within 24.1 % 24.0 % 31.8 % 13.3 % 23.9 %
% of Total 9.6 % 12.9 % 0.9 % 0.5 % 23.9 %
Count 77 111 5 3 196
Expected count 78.16 105.1 5.39 7.35 196
% within row 39.3 % 56.6 % 2.6 % 1.5 % 100.0 %
% within 24.1 % 25.9 % 22.7 % 10.0 % 24.5 %
% of Total 9.6 % 13.9 % 0.6 % 0.4 % 24.5 %
Count 319 429 22 30 800
Expected count 319 429 22 30 800
% within row 39.9 % 53.6 % 2.8 % 3.8 % 100.0 %
% within 100.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 % 100.0 %
% of Total 39.9 % 53.6 % 2.8 % 3.8 % 100.0 %
Suspicion Categories: 0 = none; 1 = Mentioned envy, resentment, or politics; 
2 = Suspicious of article authenticity; 3 = Guessed hypotheses/multiple independent variables
Hard Work X  
    No Harm
Total
Hard Work X 
Harm
Suspicion Category
  Inherited X  
    No Harm
  Inherited X  
     Harm
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authenticity, and 4% either guessed hypotheses and/or combinations of the independent 
variables in the study. Spearman’s rho rank-order correlations indicated that participant 
level of suspiciousness was not significantly associated with envy in response to the 
entrepreneurs, rs (798) = -.001, p = .97, dispositional envy (measured with the 
dispositional malicious envy subscale of the BeMaS), rs (798) = -.01, p = .88, either 
manipulation check, |rss| < .04, ps > .30, or political orientation, rs (798) = .02, p = .63. 
However, there was a weak negative correlation between social desirability and 
suspiciousness, rs (798) = -.09, p = .008. Given these results indicating few differences 
between the responses of suspicious and non-suspicious participants, no participant’s data 
were excluded on the basis of suspicion. 
 Collapsing across Order and Company/Entrepreneur factors. All participants 
responded to articles on entrepreneurs “Gary Taylor” and “Andy Simmons” in 
counterbalanced order (Order: Taylor First, n = 391, 48.8%; Simmons First, n = 409, 
52.2%). To ensure that order of presentation did not have carryover effects on responses to 
the individual differences measures, a series of independent samples t-tests were 
conducted with individual differences measures as the outcome and Order as the predictor. 
Order did not predict responses to the political ideology, dispositional envy, and social 
desirability scales, ts < 0.70, ps > .50, although a small difference was observed on 
dispositional benign envy whereby participants in the Taylor First condition (M = 3.67, SD 
= 1.24), scored slightly higher than participants in the Simmons First condition (M = 3.49, 
SD = 1.26), t(798) = 2.03, p = .042, d = 0.14. Because only a single, modest difference 
was found across the 4 tests, results for this study were collapsed across order. 
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 Results were also collapsed across Company/Entrepreneur (ball bearing company 
buyer Gary Taylor vs. hubcap manufacturing company buyer Andy Simmons), as 
participants responded to two fundamentally similar articles for purposes of internal 
replication. For example, participants in the Inherited X Harmful condition read about and 
responded to  
two separate articles describing an entrepreneur who was gifted millions of dollars by his 
family and laid off workers in the pursuit of further personal wealth.  
To ensure that Company/Entrepreneur did not affect outcomes, I conducted a 
series of mixed factorial ANOVAs on seven items,18 with Company/Entrepreneur as a 
within-participants factor and Hard Work and Harmful as between-participants factors. 
Across all the ANOVAs, there were no substantial main effects or interaction effects 
involving Company/Entrepreneur, as all ηp2 values were < .01.  
To further ensure that the articles about “Gary Taylor” and “Andy Simmons” were 
perceived roughly equivalently, I correlated several reactions to the two entrepreneurs, and 
then submitted those reactions to paired t-test analyses, with Company/Entrepreneur as the 
predictor. Responses to the question “I am a little envious of [Entrepreneur]” were highly 
correlated, r(791) = .68, p < .001, and responses did not differ significantly across 
Company/Entrepreneur, MTaylor = 2.78, MSimmons = 2.84, t(792) = -1.07, p = .29. 
Perceptions that each entrepreneur’s “source of startup money was fair” were also highly 
correlated, r(786) = .72, p < .001, and nearly identical on average, MTaylor = 3.83, MSimmons 
= 3.82, t(787) = 0.28, p = .78. Finally, perceptions that each entrepreneur “harmed the 
                                                 
18 The items tested were as follows: “I am a little envious of Taylor/Simmons;” “The way Taylor/Simmons 
got his initial wealth was fair;” “Taylor’s/Simmons’ actions were fair;” “I resent Taylor’s/Simmons’
wealth;” “I resent Taylor’s/Simmons’ actions;” “I feel inspired to get wealth myself;” and “Taylor/Simmons 
is a very skilled businessperson.” 
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workers in the [Kansas/Ohio] company” were also highly related, r(795) = .80, p < .001, 
and item means were virtually identical, MTaylor = 2.61, MSimmons = 2.60, t(796) = -0.20, p = 
.84. 
Given the demonstrated near-equivalence of the articles in terms of the responses 
they elicited, Company/Entrepreneur was collapsed by averaging each participant’s 
responses to the two entrepreneurs about whom they read. Collapsing across Order and 
Company/Entrepreneur factors yielded the expected (and final) 2 (Source) X 2 (Harmful 
Actions) between-participants experimental design. 
Statistical Analysis 
 All data analyses were conducted in R version 3.2.3 (R Core Team, 2013) and/or 
SPSS version 22.0 (IBM Inc., 2013). Correlation, regression, and moderated regression 
analyses were conducted per Cohen et al.’s (2003) guidelines using SPSS. Moderated 
mediation and simple mediation analyses were conducted in SPSS with Hayes’ (2012) 
PROCESS macro using 10,000 bias-corrected bootstrapped resamples (cf. Preacher et al., 
2007). Simple slopes tests were conducted in R.  
Modeling envy and resentment. I separately modeled envy and resentment with 
contrast-coded Source (-.5 = Inherited, .5 = Hard Work) and Harmful Actions (-.5 = Not 
Harmful, .5 = Harmful) as binary predictors, and mean-centered Liberalism and social 
desirability (a covariate) as continuous predictors. I initially included all possible 
interaction terms (e.g., the 4-way interaction), per Yzerbyt, Muller, & Judd (2004), who 
argued that, in order to prevent biased estimation of regression coefficients for interaction 
effects of theoretical interest, all possible IV X covariate interactions should be included 
in multiple regression models. Yzerbyt et al. (2004) further noted that under some 
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circumstances failure to include a non-significant IV x covariate interaction could lead to 
false-positive results on the interaction effect(s) of theoretical interest. However, Hayes 
(2012) reasoned that while IV X covariate interactions should indeed be tested, such terms 
can be dropped when they are (1) not statistically significant, and (2) when they were not 
predicted a priori. Accordingly, I dropped the IV X covariate interactions from the models 
for both envy and resentment, as (1) all p-values for those tests were ≥ .15 and (2) I had 
not predicted any IV X covariate interactions. Thus, reported results include main effects 
tests of the 3 IVs and the covariate (i.e., Source, Harmful Actions, Liberalism, and social 
desirability), and all possible interactions among the 3 IVs. 
 I also checked regression model assumptions and found “fanning” 
heteroskedasticity of residuals (Cohen et al., 2003).19 Thus, I also ran the envy and 
resentment models using heteroskedasticity-consistent HC3 and HC4m standard errors 
estimators, which keep Type-I error rates very near nominal levels in the presence of 
heteroskedasticity; the latter estimator also adjusts for high leverage points (Cribari-Neto 
& da Silva, 2011; Hayes & Cai, 2007). Using these estimators yielded significance test 
results very similar to those using regular OLS standard errors. Regression results reported 
in-text are based on HC4m standard error estimators. For comparison purposes, results 
using standard OLS and HC3 standard error estimators are also summarized in the 
regression tables for envy and resentment. 
                                                 
19 There was also non-normality of residuals in both models, but given the large sample size, this was 
considered a negligible issue (Cohen et al., 2003). Bivariate scatterplots did not reveal any non-linear 
patterns of association. 
 
50 
 
Chapter Three: Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Participants (N = 800) were primarily female (n = 509, 63.6%) and predominantly 
Caucasian (n = 688, 86.0%). Sixty-seven (8.4%) participants indicated they were African 
American and 33 (4.1%) indicated they were Asian American; 46 people of any race 
(5.8%) indicated Hispanic ethnicity (Table 3). The sample was somewhat less 
homogeneous in terms of age, subjective SES, and political ideology (Table 4). 
Participants ranged in age from 18 to 87 years old (M = 33.70, SD = 14.46), and most 
participants placed themselves near the middle of the subjective SES scale (M = 4.68, SD 
= 1.73). Overall, the sample tended to lean slightly liberal (M = 3.21, SD = 1.22). 
 Across conditions, participants tended to report only modest amounts of envy, 
resentment, anger, and moral disgust (Table 5), but this was expected, in part because of 
the emotions’ social undesirability. Such results were also in keeping with previous 
research on envy and related emotions (Smith & Kim, 2007). However, participants did 
report higher levels of all four of these negative emotions in the Harmful conditions. 
Conversely, actions were considered to be fairer in the Not Harmful than the Harmful 
conditions. Finally, the entrepreneur’s source of initial wealth was considered to be fairer 
in the Hard Work than the Inherited conditions. 
  Negative emotional reactions to the wealthy entrepreneurs tended to be strongly 
correlated, although the correlations between those emotions and the fairness measures 
tended to be somewhat lower (Table 620). Descriptively, the emotion most strongly 
  
                                                 
20 In Tables 6 and 7, both Pearson’s r and Kendall’s Tau-b non-parametric correlations are provided, as 
some variables were heavily skewed. Results were similar whether using Pearson’s r or Kendall’s Tau-b, 
although the non-parametric correlations tended to be slightly smaller in magnitude. 
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Table 3: Gender, Race, and Ethnicity 
Gender n % 
Female 509 63.6% 
Male 286 35.8% 
Prefer Not to Answer 5 0.6% 
Total 800 100.0% 
Race n % 
Caucasian 688 86.0% 
African American 67 8.4% 
Asian American 33 4.1% 
Native American 10 1.3% 
Two or More Races 16 2.0% 
Other/Prefer Not to Answer 19 2.4% 
Total† 833 104.1% 
Ethnicity n % 
Hispanic (of Any Race) 46 5.8% 
Not Hispanic 733 91.6% 
Prefer Not to Answer 21 2.6% 
Total 800 100.0% 
†Percentage sums to over 100% because some participants indicated multiple 
races 
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Table 4: Demographic Statistics  
Demographic Variable M SD 
Percentile 
5% 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 95% 
Age 33.7 14.46 18 19 20 31 43 57 62 
Subjective SES (1-9 
scale) 4.68 1.73 2 2 3 5 6 7 7 
Liberalism (1-5 scale) 3.21 1.22 1.00 1.25 2.25 3.25 4.25 5.00 5.00 
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Table 5: Descriptives Statistics by Experimental Condition 
Outcome 
(0-6 scale) Source    
Harmful 
Actions n M Mdn SD 
Envy 
Inherited X Not Harmful 211 1.38 1.10 1.11 
    Hard Work X Not Harmful 196 1.30 1.10 1.10 
Inherited X    Harmful 202 2.03 2.00 1.41 
    Hard Work X    Harmful 191 1.93 1.80 1.31 
Resentment 
Inherited X Not Harmful 211 1.18 1.00 1.23 
    Hard Work X Not Harmful 196 0.97 0.50 1.22 
Inherited X    Harmful 202 2.52 2.50 1.60 
    Hard Work X    Harmful 191 2.40 2.50 1.56 
Anger 
Inherited X Not Harmful 211 0.84 0.25 1.12 
    Hard Work X Not Harmful 196 0.81 0.25 1.12 
Inherited X    Harmful 202 2.52 2.50 1.69 
    Hard Work X    Harmful 191 2.53 2.50 1.70 
Moral 
Disgust 
Inherited X Not Harmful 211 0.86 0.50 1.06 
    Hard Work X Not Harmful 196 0.81 0.25 1.14 
Inherited X    Harmful 202 2.62 2.62 1.76 
    Hard Work X    Harmful 191 2.65 2.50 1.77 
Fairness of 
Harmful 
Actions 
Inherited X Not Harmful 211 4.70 4.75 1.05 
    Hard Work X Not Harmful 196 4.95 5.00 1.06 
Inherited X    Harmful 202 2.51 2.50 1.66 
    Hard Work X    Harmful 191 2.60 2.75 1.56 
Fairness of 
Initial 
Wealth 
Source 
Inherited X Not Harmful 211 3.61 3.50 1.47 
    Hard Work X Not Harmful 196 4.64 5.00 1.23 
Inherited X    Harmful 202 3.01 3.00 1.58 
    Hard Work X    Harmful 191 3.99 4.00 1.38 
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correlated with judgments of (un)fairness was moral disgust, which was not surprising, 
given mounting research indicating that moral disgust may be particularly closely linked 
to perceived unfairness (e.g., Chapman et al., 2009). 
Manipulation Checks and Perceived Fairness 
 Results indicated that the Source and Harmful Actions manipulations were 
successful. Hard Work condition entrepreneurs were much more strongly perceived as 
having earned their initial capital through hard work (M = 4.66, SD = 1.21) than 
entrepreneurs in the Inherited condition (M = 1.56, SD = 1.47), t(798) = 32.58, p < .001, d 
= 2.31. Participants also perceived that Harmful condition entrepreneurs harmed others 
(M = 3.44, SD = 1.44) much more than did entrepreneurs in the Not Harmful condition 
(M = 1.15, SD = 1.16), t(798) = 24.73, p < .001, d = 1.75.  
 As expected, the way in which Inherited condition entrepreneurs obtained their 
initial wealth (i.e., as a gift from family) was considered less fair (M = 3.32, SD = 1.55) 
than the way in which Hard Work condition entrepreneurs obtained their initial wealth 
(i.e., through sustained hard work) (M = 4.32, SD = 1.34), t(798) = -9.74, p < .001, d = -
0.69. In a similar vein, Harmful condition entrepreneurs’ actions were considered much 
less fair (M = 2.56, SD = 1.61) than those of the Not Harmful condition entrepreneurs (M 
= 4.82, SD = 1.06), t(798) = -23.59, p < .001, d = -1.69.  
Envy and Liberalism 
Correlation analyses were performed on measures of Political Ideology and both 
state and dispositional envy to address whether liberals might be more envy-prone than 
conservatives. As predicted, state envy of the wealthy entrepreneurs was positively 
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associated with Liberalism, whether Liberalism was measured concurrently, r(798) = .22, 
p < .001, or weeks earlier during MT, r(135) = .17, p = .050.21  
When measured concurrently, Liberalism was significantly positively associated 
with dispositional envy, whether measured with the DES (Smith et al., 1999), r(797) = 
.11, p = .002, or the Dispositional Malicious Envy subscale of the BeMaS (Lange & 
Crusius, 2015), r(798) = .17, p < .001. However, when Liberalism was measured during 
MT, there was not a significant association between Liberalism and dispositional envy, 
rDES (135) = .02, p = .79; rBeMaS (135) = .11, p = .20. When measured concurrently, 
Liberalism was significantly negatively correlated with dispositional benign envy, r(798) 
= -.07, p = .040. However, when Liberalism was measured during MT, there was not a 
significant association between Liberalism and dispositional benign envy, r(135) = -.11, 
p = .22.  
In summary, associations between Liberalism and state envy of the entrepreneurs 
were both more consistent and stronger in magnitude than associations between 
Liberalism and dispositional envy. This was also the case with state and dispositional 
benign envy (Table 7).  
Envy  
Regression results for envy (Table 8) indicated no significant main effect of 
Source (i.e., Inherited or earned through Hard Work), b = -0.09, SEHC4m = 0.08, t = -1.11, 
p = .27. There were, however, significant main effects of Harmful Actions (i.e., Not 
  
                                                 
21 When measured concurrently, Liberalism was significantly positively associated with dispositional envy, 
r(798) = .25, p < .001. In contrast, when Liberalism was measured during MT, there was not a significant 
association between Liberalism and state resentment, r(135) = .11, p = .22. State benign envy was 
negatively associated with Liberalism, whether Liberalism was measured concurrently, r(798) = -.12, p < 
.001, or weeks earlier during MT, r(135) = -.19, p = .025. 
57
 
 
Ta
bl
e 
7:
 C
or
re
la
tio
ns
 a
m
on
g 
Li
be
ra
lis
m
, E
nv
y,
 a
nd
 F
ai
rn
es
s J
ud
gm
en
ts
 
 
1 
Li
be
ra
l
—
0.
22
**
*
-0
.1
2
**
*
0.
17
**
*
0.
11
**
-0
.0
7
*
-0
.0
9
*
-0
.1
8
**
*
-0
.1
7
**
*
0.
88
**
*
0.
02
8
0.
08
1
2 
En
vy
—
0.
08
8
*
0.
65
**
*
0.
55
**
*
0.
15
3
**
*
-0
.2
3
**
*
-0
.4
2
**
*
-0
.3
**
*
0.
16
8
*
0.
1
0.
30
7
**
*
3 
B
en
ig
n 
En
vy
—
0.
13
**
*
0.
23
**
*
0.
57
9
**
*
-0
.1
3
**
*
0.
46
9
**
*
0.
36
1
**
*
-0
.1
9
*
0.
16
8
*
0.
15
9
4 
D
isp
. M
al
ic
io
us
 E
nv
y
—
0.
66
**
*
0.
20
2
**
*
-0
.3
5
**
*
-0
.1
8
**
*
-0
.1
8
**
*
0.
11
0.
07
7
0.
57
8
**
*
5 
D
isp
. E
nv
y
—
0.
23
5
**
*
-0
.3
5
**
*
-0
.1
**
-0
.0
9
*
0.
02
3
0.
06
2
0.
44
2
**
*
6 
D
isp
. B
en
ig
n 
En
vy
—
-0
.1
1
**
0.
14
4
**
*
0.
14
**
*
-0
.1
1
0.
55
1
**
*
0.
14
8
7 
So
ci
al
 D
es
ira
bi
lit
y
—
0.
04
4
0.
06
6
0.
04
1
-0
.1
6
-0
.3
7
**
*
8 
Fa
irn
es
s 
of
 A
ct
io
ns
—
0.
51
2
**
*
-0
.2
4
**
0.
01
6
0.
09
5
9 
Fa
irn
es
s 
of
 In
iti
al
 W
ea
lth
 S
ou
rc
e
—
-0
.2
1
*
0.
05
9
0.
07
5
10
 M
T 
Li
be
ra
l
—
-0
.0
1
0.
07
6
11
 M
T 
D
isp
. B
en
ig
n 
En
vy
—
0.
24
5
**
12
 M
T 
D
isp
. M
al
ic
io
us
 E
nv
y
—
1 
Li
be
ra
l
—
0.
15
**
*
-0
.0
9
**
*
0.
11
**
*
0.
05
*
-0
.0
5
-0
.0
7
**
-0
.1
2
**
*
-0
.1
1
**
*
0.
77
2
**
*
0.
03
8
0.
03
8
2 
En
vy
—
0.
05
4
*
0.
5
**
*
0.
43
**
*
0.
10
2
**
*
-0
.1
6
**
*
-0
.3
1
**
*
-0
.2
2
**
*
0.
12
6
*
0.
03
7
0.
22
5
**
*
3 
B
en
ig
n 
En
vy
—
0.
07
**
0.
16
**
*
0.
40
9
**
*
-0
.1
**
*
0.
33
8
**
*
0.
26
3
**
*
-0
.1
0.
09
9
0.
10
8
4 
D
isp
. M
al
ic
io
us
 E
nv
y
—
0.
51
**
*
0.
13
8
**
*
-0
.2
7
**
*
-0
.1
7
**
*
-0
.1
5
**
*
0.
07
0.
07
8
0.
42
4
**
*
5 
D
isp
. E
nv
y
—
0.
17
5
**
*
-0
.2
6
**
*
-0
.1
**
*
-0
.0
9
**
*
-0
.0
2
0.
04
7
0.
30
8
**
*
6 
D
isp
. B
en
ig
n 
En
vy
—
-0
.0
7
**
0.
10
1
**
*
0.
09
7
**
*
-0
.1
0.
34
8
**
*
0.
11
5
7 
So
ci
al
 D
es
ira
bi
lit
y
—
0.
03
9
0.
04
9
0.
01
9
-0
.1
2
*
-0
.2
3
**
*
8 
Fa
irn
es
s 
of
 A
ct
io
ns
—
0.
39
8
**
*
-0
.1
7
**
0.
04
4
0.
07
6
9 
Fa
irn
es
s 
of
 In
iti
al
 W
ea
lth
 S
ou
rc
e
—
-0
.1
4
*
0.
03
7
0.
06
7
10
 M
T 
Li
be
ra
l
—
0.
00
5
0.
04
1
11
 M
T 
D
isp
. B
en
ig
n 
En
vy
—
0.
20
4
**
*
12
 M
T 
D
isp
. M
al
ic
io
us
 E
nv
y
—
* 
p 
< 
.0
5,
 *
* 
p 
< 
.0
1,
 *
**
 p
 <
 .0
01
K
en
da
ll's
 T
au
-b
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
Pe
ar
so
n'
s 
r
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
 
58 
 
Table 8: Regular OLS and Heteroskedasticity-Robust Regression Models on Envy 
 Envy 
 Regular OLS SE Robust HC3 SE Robust HC4m SE 
Intercept 1.66 [1.58, 1.74]*** 1.66 [1.58, 1.74]*** 1.66 [1.58, 1.74]*** 
Source (Inherited = -.5, 
Hard Work = .5) 
-0.09 [-0.26, 0.07] -0.09 [-0.26, 0.07] -0.09 [-0.26, 0.07] 
Harmful (Not Harmful =  
-.5, Harmful = .5) 
0.64 [0.47, 0.80]*** 0.64 [0.47, 0.80]*** 0.64 [0.47, 0.80]*** 
Liberal 0.20 [0.14, 0.27]*** 0.20 [0.14, 0.27]*** 0.20 [0.14, 0.27]*** 
Social Desirability -0.09 [-0.11, -0.06]*** 
-0.09 [-0.11, -
0.06]*** 
-0.09 [-0.11, -
0.06]*** 
Source X Harmful 0.06 [-0.27, 0.39] 0.06 [-0.27, 0.39] 0.06 [-0.27, 0.39] 
Source X Liberal 0.12 [-0.01, 0.26]† 0.12 [-0.01, 0.25]† 0.12 [-0.01, 0.25]† 
Harmful X Liberal 0.03 [-0.10, 0.16] 0.03 [-0.10, 0.16] 0.03 [-0.10, 0.16] 
Source X Harmful X 
Liberal 
-0.07 [-0.34, 0.20] -0.07 [-0.33, 0.19] -0.07 [-0.33, 0.19] 
N 800   
R2 0.157   
Adjusted R2 0.149   
Residual SE 1.178    
F(8, 791) = 18.464***    
NOTE: Bracketed values are lower and upper bounds of the 95% confidence intervals of the 
regression estimates  
†p < .10, *p < .05, **p < 0.01, ***p < .001 
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Harmful or Harmful), b = 0.64, SEHC4m = 0.08, t = 7.58, p < .001; Liberalism, b = 0.20, 
SEHC4m = 0.03, t = 5.96, p < .001; and social desirability, b = -0.09, SEHC4m = 0.01, t = -
6.08, p < .001. The only interaction term that approached significance was Source X 
Liberalism, b = 0.12, SEHC4m = 0.07, t = 1.81, p = .071; all other ps > .42.  
I probed the Source X Liberalism interaction on envy to determine whether the 
enhancing effect of Inherited wealth on envy would be greater among liberals than 
conservatives, thereby confirming my hypothesis. However, the opposite was the case. 
Specifically, a Johnson-Neyman regions of significance analysis22 indicated that there 
was no significant effect (at p < .05) of Source on envy among people greater than 2.57 
(i.e., slightly below the midpoint) on the Liberalism scale. That is, Inherited wealth only 
strengthened envy compared to wealth earned through Hard Work among those who were 
at least slightly conservative (Figure 4). It should be noted, however, that simple slopes 
tests indicated liberals (+1 SD Liberalism) experienced significantly more envy than 
conservatives (-1 SD Liberalism) in both the Hard Work (p < .001) and Inherited (p = 
.004) conditions. Even so, per the significant interaction effect, the effect of Liberalism 
on envy was stronger in the Hard Work condition than in the Inherited condition. 
 A planned comparison confirmed the prediction that there would be a significant 
difference between conservatives (-1 SD on Liberalism) and liberals (+1 SD on 
Liberalism) on envy within the Hard Work X Not Harmful condition. Liberals (estimated 
mean = 1.60, SE = .12) reported more envy than conservatives (estimated mean = 0.95, 
SE = .12) in the Hard Work X Not Harmful condition, t(791) = 3.96, p < .001, d = .28. 
  
                                                 
22 This and all other probes of moderation, mediation, or moderated mediation effects were performed in 
PROCESS using HC3 heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error estimators. 
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Figure 4: Effect of Source on Envy Moderated by Political Ideology (Estimated Means at 
-1 SD, M, and +1 SD Liberalism) 
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Resentment  
Regression results for resentment (Table 9) indicated a marginally significant 
main effect of Source, b = -0.17, SEHC4m = 0.10, t = -1.75, p = .081. Significant main 
effects of resentment were obtained on Harmful Actions, b = 1.39, SEHC4m = 0.10, t = 
14.46, p < .001; Liberalism, b = 0.30, SEHC4m = 0.04, t = 7.55, p < .001; and social 
desirability, b = -0.059, SEHC4m = 0.02, t = -3.67, p < .001. Contrary to predictions, no 
interaction effects approached significance, ps ≥ .154.  
Although I had no a priori hypothesis about whether liberals would report more 
resentment in the Hard Work X Not Harmful condition than conservatives, I conducted a 
contrast analysis to determine whether results on resentment would mirror those on envy. 
Closely paralleling results on envy, liberals indicated more resentment (estimated mean = 
1.30, SE = .13) of Hard Work X Not Harmful condition entrepreneurs than conservatives 
in the same experimental condition (estimated mean = 0.60, SE = .14), t(791) = 3.74, p < 
.001, d = .27. 
Context Effects on other Emotions 
 Context was also predicted to exert effects on emotions other than envy and 
resentment, including anger and moral disgust. As expected, participants experienced 
greater anger in the Harmful condition (M = 2.53, SD = 1.69) than in the Not Harmful 
condition (M = 0.83, SD = 1.12), t(798) = 16.80, p < .001, d = 1.19, and greater moral 
disgust was also indicated in the Harmful condition (M = 2.64, SD = 1.76) than in the Not 
Harmful condition (M = 1.10, SD = 0.05), t(798) = 17.37, p < .001, d = 1.29. On the other 
hand, there was virtually no difference in moral disgust between the Inherited (M = 1.73, 
SD = 1.69) and Hard Work (M = 1.72, SD = 1.75) conditions, t(798) = 0.07, p = .95, d =  
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Table 9: Regular OLS and Heteroskedasticity-Robust Regression Models on Resentment 
 Resentment 
 Regular OLS SE Robust HC3 SE Robust HC4m SE 
Intercept 1.77 [1.67, 1.86]*** 1.77 [1.67, 1.86]*** 1.77 [1.67, 1.86]*** 
Source (Inherited = -.5, 
Hard Work = .5) 
-0.17 [-0.35, 0.02]† -0.17 [-0.36, 0.02]† -0.17 [-0.36, 0.02]† 
Harmful (Not Harmful 
= -.5, Harmful = .5) 
1.39 [1.20, 1.57]*** 1.39 [1.20, 1.57]*** 1.39 [1.20, 1.57]*** 
Liberal 0.30 [0.22, 0.38]*** 0.30 [0.22, 0.38]*** 0.30 [0.22, 0.38]*** 
Social Desirability -0.06 [-0.09, -0.03]*** 
-0.06 [-0.09, -
0.03]*** 
-0.06 [-0.09, -
0.03]*** 
Source X Harmful 0.15 [-0.22, 0.53] 0.15 [-0.22, 0.53] 0.15 [-0.22, 0.53] 
Source X Liberal 0.05 [-0.10, 0.20] 0.05 [-0.10, 0.20] 0.05 [-0.10, 0.20] 
Harmful X Liberal 0.11 [-0.04, 0.26] 0.11 [-0.04, 0.26] 0.11 [-0.04, 0.26] 
Source X Harmful X 
Liberal 
-0.09 [-0.39, 0.22] -0.09 [-0.39, 0.22] -0.09 [-0.39, 0.22] 
N 800   
R2 0.27   
Adjusted R2 0.27   
Residual SE 1.35   
F(8, 791) = 37.26***    
NOTE: Bracketed values are lower and upper bounds of the 95% confidence intervals of 
the regression estimates  
†p < .10, *p < .05, **p < 0.01, ***p < .001 
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.01, disconfirming my hypothesis. Perhaps moral disgust is more likely in response to 
more clear-cut examples of unfairness than having received a large sum of money from 
family, such as blatantly harming others in the pursuit of personal gain.  
Process Models 
 Justifications for actions and fairness. As predicted, the effect of liberal 
political ideology on the perceived fairness of the entrepreneur’s actions was mediated 
via decreased endorsement of justifications for the entrepreneur’s actions, b = -0.25, 95% 
CI [-0.33, -0.17]; no significant direct effect remained after taking into account the 
indirect effect, p = .96 (Figure 5). The model accounted for a very large proportion of 
variance in fairness judgments, R2 = .69, p < .001. Because of the strong link between 
justifications and fairness, b = 1.06, p < .001, a follow-up exploratory serial mediation 
analysis including mediation pathways from (1) LiberalismJustificationsEnvy, (2) 
LiberalismFairness of ActionsEnvy, and (3) LiberalismJustificationsFairness of 
ActionsEnvy was conducted to explore how those variables might be related to 
ideology-based differences in envy (Figure 6). Significant effects via pathways (1), b = 
0.05, 95% CI [0.02, 0.08], and (3), b = 0.04, 95% CI [0.01, 0.07] were obtained, and the 
model explained approximately one quarter of the variance in envy, R2 = .25, p < .001. 
Accounting for all indirect pathways, a significant direct effect of Liberalism on envy 
remained, b = 0.12, 95% CI [0.05, 0.19]. The ratio of the indirect effect to the total effect 
of Liberalism on envy was .41, 95% CI [.26, .64].  
This pattern suggests that conservatives may have perceived the actions wealthy 
entrepreneurs took in pursuit of more wealth as more justifiable and fair than liberals did, 
helping to explain why they reacted to the wealthy entrepreneurs with somewhat less 
 
64 
 
  Figure 5: Mediation of Effect of Political Ideology on Fairness of Actions via 
Endorsement of Justifications for Actions 
NOTE: Indirect effect of Liberalism on perceived fairness of actions via 
endorsement of justifications for actions: ab = -0.25, 95% CI [-0.33, -0.17] 
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Fairness    
Indirect effect of Liberalism on Envy through Justifications for Actions 
= a1b1 = 0.05, 95% CI [.02, .08]  
Indirect effect of Liberalism on Envy through Perceived Fairness of Actions 
= a2b2 = -0.0002, 95% CI [-.01, .01], ns  
Indirect effect of Liberalism on Envy through Justifications for Actions and 
Perceived Fairness of Actions in serial = a1d21b2 = 0.04, 95% CI [.01, .07] 
Direct effect of Liberalism on Envy = c’ = 0.12, 95% CI [.05, .19] 
Figure 6: Effect on Political Ideology on Envy Serial Multiple Mediation Model 
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 envy than liberals. However, there are plausible alternative explanations for the obtained 
pattern, especially because the lack of a time lag between the mediators in the serial 
mediation model makes causal precedence unclear. 
Source, fairness of initial wealth, and envy. I predicted that (1) Liberalism 
would moderate the direct effect of Source on the perceived fairness of the entrepreneur’s 
initial wealth source, and (2) Liberalism would moderate the mediated effect of Source 
on Envy via the perceived fairness of the entrepreneur’s initial wealth source. This 
predicted model received partial support (Figure 7). Although Liberalism did not 
moderate the mediated effect of Source on envy via fairness of initial wealth, b = -.01, 
95% CI [-0.05, 0.03], Liberalism marginally-significantly moderated the direct effect of 
Source on envy, b = 0.12, p = .076. The marginally significant direct effect of Source on 
envy was also positive, b = 0.14, p = .099. Probing the interaction revealed that after 
accounting for the envy-reducing indirect effect of Source via fairness of initial wealth (b 
= -.23, p < .001), there was no significant effect of Source on envy among relatively 
conservative participants. Surprisingly, however, Hard Work entrepreneurs engendered 
somewhat more envy than Inherited wealth entrepreneurs among people politically left of 
center (Figure 8).  
In seeking to better understand the current model, it might first be noted that the 
envy-reducing indirect effect of Source on envy via increased perceived fairness of initial 
wealth was essentially identical across all levels of Liberalism. This was evidenced by the 
lack of moderated mediation and the very similar magnitude of the indirect effect among 
participants across the political spectrum (e.g., b = -.22 and b = -.24 for those at the 10th 
and 90th percentiles of Liberalism, respectively). Thus, results suggested knowing that a   
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Figure 7: Direct Effect of Source on Envy Moderated by Political Ideology 
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Figure 8: Conditional Direct Effect of Source on Envy at 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th 
Percentiles of Liberalism 
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NOTE: Dashed line indicates non-significant (p > .10) direct effect of Source on envy. 
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wealthy person’s initial wealth was earned through Hard Work (as opposed to having 
been Inherited) may have had similar palliative effects on liberals’ and conservatives’ 
envy. Even so, certain perceived personal qualities of the Hard Work entrepreneur may 
have stoked liberals’ envy beyond any envy-reducing effect his Algeresque story had via 
increased perceived fairness of his initial wealth. To begin to address this possibility, I 
explored whether Source would moderate the effects of Liberalism on perceived 
competence and greed, as perceived competence and greed were both associated with 
envy in the current study, rcompetence = -.34,23 rgreed = .49, ps < .001. Results of moderated 
regression analyses indicated that Source did not moderate the significant effects of 
Liberalism on perceived competence and greed. That is, across Source conditions, 
Liberalism was associated with viewing wealthy entrepreneurs as less competent (b = -
0.15, p < .001) and more greedy (b = 0.35, p < .001), and there was no significant Source 
X Liberalism interaction on competence and greed, ps > .54. Given these results, a 
relatively simple explanation for the model represented in Figures 7 and 8 seems 
possible, if not likely: because liberals tended to experience more envy in general, they 
had more envy left over to explain after taking into account the mediated effect of the 
Source manipulation via the perceived fairness of the initial wealth.  
 Harmful Actions, fairness of actions, and envy. Political Ideology was 
predicted to moderate (1) the direct effect of Harmful Actions on envy, and (2) the 
                                                 
23 Finding a negative correlation between perceived competence and envy may seem counterintuitive, as 
competence makes another person more “enviable,” at least in a colloquial sense. However, given the close 
link between perceived unfairness and envy, a negative association between competence and envy actually 
makes sense—a more competent wealthy person is likely to be perceived as more deserving of his or her 
professional and financial success than a relatively less competent wealthy person. Still, in keeping with the 
intuitive idea that perceiving another to be more competent is likely to make him or her more “enviable,” 
non-hostile, benign envy was positively associated with perceived competence, r(798) = .40, p < .001. 
These findings once again underscore the crucial role of the perceived justice and fairness of outcomes in 
the experience of envy (Smith & Kim, 2007; Floyd, Hoogland, & Smith, 2015; Hoogland et al., in press). 
 
70 
 
indirect of Harmful Actions on envy via the perceived fairness of the entrepreneur’s 
actions. Results provided partial support for the predicted model (Figure 9). Although 
Liberalism did not moderate the direct effect of Harmful Actions on envy, b = -0.05, p = 
.43, it did moderate the mediated effect of Harmful Actions on envy via the perceived 
fairness of the entrepreneur’s actions, per the significant index of moderated mediation,24 
b = .08, SE = .02, 95% CI [.04, .13]. As illustrated in Figure 10, the more liberal a 
participant was, the more strongly harming workers (i.e., the Harmful condition) 
increased their envy by way of decreasing the perceived fairness of the entrepreneur’s 
actions.  
Exploratory Analyses 
 Perceived harm’s link to fairness judgments. I explored whether increases in 
the perceived harmfulness of actions might determine the perceived unfairness of those 
actions, as posited by proponents of dyadic morality theory (DMT) (e.g., Schein & Gray, 
2015), and how such a process might help explain differences in envy between 
conservatives and liberals. I conducted a simple mediation analysis (Figure 11) with 
Liberalism as the predictor, the perceived harmfulness of the entrepreneur’s actions as the 
mediator, and the perceived fairness of the entrepreneur’s actions as the outcome. In 
keeping with DMT, results indicated that no significant direct effect of Liberalism on the 
perceived fairness of the entrepreneur’s actions remained after taking into account the 
indirect effect of Liberalism via harm perceptions, bdirect effect = -0.02, p = .54; bindirect effect = 
-0.23, 95% CI [-0.32, -0.15]. Taken together with Liberalism’s strengthening of the 
mediated effect of Harmful Actions on envy via the perceived fairness of the 
                                                 
24 A significant index of moderated mediation indicates that the moderator moderates the mediated effect 
throughout the moderator’s range of values (for a review, see Hayes, 2015). 
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NOTES: Index of moderated mediation: b = .08, SE = .02, 95% CI [.04, .13], 
Conditional indirect effect of Harmful Actions on envy via perceived fairness 
of entrepreneur’s actions:   ω = a1b1 + a3b1W = .6328 + .0795(mean-centered 
Liberalism)  
Figure 9: Moderation by Political Ideology of Indirect Effect of Harmful Actions on 
Envy via Perceived Fairness of Entrepreneur’s Actions 
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Figure 10: Conditional Indirect Effect of Harmful Actions on Envy via Perceived 
Fairness of Actions at 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th Percentiles of Liberalism 
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NOTE: Indirect effect of Liberalism on perceived fairness of actions via perceived 
harmfulness: ab = -0.23, 95% CI [-0.32, -0.15] 
 
Figure 11: Test of Mediation of Effect of Political Ideology on Perceived Fairness of 
Actions via Perceived Harmfulness of Actions 
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entrepreneur’s actions (per the previous subsection), these results suggest that liberals 
may perceive entrepreneurs’ actions as more harmful, and therefore unfair, than 
conservatives, ultimately leading to enhanced envy of them. This raises the question of 
whether such liberal-conservative differences in harm and fairness perceptions were 
present only in the Harmful condition, especially since there was no clear indication that 
the entrepreneurs in the Not Harmful condition had harmed anyone.  
Subsetting and analyzing the data by Harmful condition (i.e., Harmful or Not 
Harmful) indicated that Liberalism was associated with the perceived harm done by and 
fairness of the entrepreneur’s actions within both the Harmful condition, rharmfulness(391) = 
.36, p < .001, rfairness(391) = -.30, p < .001, and the Not Harmful condition (albeit more 
weakly), rharmfulness(405) = .12, p = .017, rfairness(405) = -.12, p = .021. The difference 
between the correlations observed in the two conditions was significant for both 
perceived harm, Z = 3.61, p < .001, and perceived fairness, Z = -2.66, p = .004. Thus, 
ideology-based differences in perceived harmfulness and associated (un)fairness 
judgments are especially pronounced when harm clearly has been done, but such 
differences are also present to a lesser extent when no direct indication of harm-doing 
exists. While Liberalism most strongly enhances perceived harm when harm clearly has 
been done (per liberals’ greater endorsement of Harm and Fairness as foundations for 
moral judgments), relative to conservatives, liberals also appear less likely to give 
wealthy people who have not necessarily harmed anyone the benefit of the doubt. In 
keeping with this line of reasoning, although Liberalism was more strongly associated 
with perceived greed within the Harmful condition, r(391) = .32, p < .001, it was also 
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associated with greed perceptions in the Not Harmful condition, r(405) = .18, p < .001, Z 
= 2.11, p = .035. 
Do downscale liberals envy wealthy people significantly more than upscale 
liberals? Envy-based, conservative explanations of liberal opposition to concentrated 
wealth suggest that liberals should feel more envy when they are low rather than high in 
SES, while conservatives across the socioeconomic spectrum should feel similar, low 
levels of envy. However, I did not find evidence that the conservative-liberal gap in envy 
varied as a function of subjective SES, although subjective SES had weak zero-order 
correlations with both liberal political ideology, r(749) = -.11, p = .002, and envy, r(749) 
= -.07, p = .046. As illustrated in Figure 12, in a model including subjective SES, 
Liberalism, and their interaction as predictors of envy (and social desirability as a 
covariate), only Liberalism, b = 0.18, p < .001, and social desirability, b = -0.08, p < .001, 
were significantly associated with envy. In short, Liberalism’s link to envy was not 
significantly stronger or weaker among participants at the high vs. low ends of the 
socioeconomic spectrum. 
Chapter Four: Discussion 
This study set out to begin answering a number of questions on “the politics of 
envy,” including whether, other things being equal, liberals are more prone to envy than 
conservatives. The tentative answer to that question would appear to be a qualified 
“Yes,” but the observed links were weak, and it was telling that political liberalism was 
more strongly associated with reactions to specific, wealthy entrepreneurs than with a 
general disposition toward envying anyone, be they coworkers from the office or wealthy 
CEOs. That is, liberals appear to be only slightly more prone to envy than conservatives, 
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  Figure 12: Test of Moderation by Political Ideology of Effect of Subjective SES on Envy 
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but such differences become somewhat more pronounced when faced with people whose 
wealth and backstories evoke fairness and justice concerns.  
Competing conservative and liberal narratives about opposition to concentrated 
wealth and income inequality largely hinge on the question of whether envy or fairness 
concerns underlie that opposition. Conservative critics contend that opposition to great 
wealth is based in envy of wealthy people’s successes, rather than the more socially-
legitimate fairness or justice concerns frequently cited by liberals. Psychological theory 
and previous empirical work suggest that differences between conservatives and liberals 
in envy and other negative emotional reactions to wealthy people might be explained, at 
least in part, by differences in their perceptions and judgments of relevant contextual 
factors. Thus, I examined the extent to which contextual factors theorized to influence 
differences in moral judgments and emotional reactions between conservatives and 
liberals modulated conservatives’ and liberals’ reactions to wealthy people.  
Political Ideology and Reactions to Wealth 
Across conditions, liberals had less favorable reactions to wealthy entrepreneurs. 
They reported more envy, resentment, anger, and moral disgust toward them than did 
conservatives. Moreover, liberals considered the source of the wealthy entrepreneurs’ 
wealth and their actions in the pursuit of wealth to be less fair than conservatives, and 
reported less benign envy as well. Finally, relative to conservatives, liberals considered 
the entrepreneurs to be greedier and less competent. These associations tended to be 
stronger when the entrepreneurs harmed others in the pursuit of wealth, but they obtained 
even when the entrepreneur had done no apparent harm. Thus, liberals would appear to 
like and trust wealthy people (or at least wealthy capitalists) less than conservatives 
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(perhaps in part because of negative stereotyping), but these ideology-based differences 
might be more pronounced when there is clear evidence that a wealthy person has harmed 
others in the pursuit of wealth. Liberals’ lesser endorsement of economic justifications 
for entrepreneurs’ actions (whether overtly harmful or not) heightened envy via both their 
effects on fairness perceptions and directly (see Figure 6). An exploratory analysis, 
moreover, suggested that differences between liberals and conservatives in the perceived 
fairness of the entrepreneurs’ actions may be explained by liberals’ perceiving the actions 
to be more harmful. These are important findings in terms of the persistent debate over 
the origins of opposition to concentrated wealth, as they suggest that liberals’ (un)fairness 
judgments are not necessarily based in envy, but rather legitimate concern for the 
economic welfare of others and, perhaps, broader procedural and distributive justice 
concerns. Ironically, those legitimate fairness and justice concerns promote socially-
undesirable envy and resentment. Moreover, a substantial proportion of the effect of 
Liberalism on envy was not explained by fairness and justice concerns. Taken together, 
these results suggest that there likely is some truth to both conservatives’ envy-based and 
liberals’ justice-based explanations for the liberal tendency to oppose concentrated 
wealth.  
Context, Political Ideology, and Reactions to Wealth 
To examine the extent to which ideology-based reactions to wealth might vary as 
a function of key contextual factors, I selected and experimentally manipulated two 
factors which were expected to elicit somewhat different reactions from liberals and 
conservatives, based on relevant theory and research (e.g., Haidt, 2012). Specifically, I 
experimentally manipulated whether the wealthy entrepreneurs to which participants 
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reacted (1) came to be wealthy through a large family gift or earned their money through 
hard work (Source), and whether they (2) harmed others while pursuing more wealth 
(Harmful Actions). Results demonstrated that conservative-liberal differences in envious 
reactions to wealth were, to a degree, context-dependent, as those differences varied as a 
function of experimental condition. As noted, however, across conditions, liberals had a 
general tendency toward greater envy and resentment of the wealthy entrepreneurs. As 
further noted, ideology-based differences were mediated, at least in part, by fairness and 
justice concerns.  
Source. Effects of Source on envy and resentment were weaker, less consistent, 
and somewhat less in keeping with hypotheses than those of Harmful Actions. Contrary 
to predictions, there was no main effect of Source (i.e., Inherited wealth or wealth earned 
through Hard Work) on envy, although there was a marginally significant Source X 
Liberalism interaction. Despite obtaining an interaction as predicted, the form that 
interaction took was the opposite of what was expected—rather than the Source 
manipulation impacting liberals’ envy more strongly than that of conservatives, there was 
only a significant effect of Source (whereby Hard Work decreased envy) among 
relatively conservative participants. Further, the effect of Liberalism on envy was 
significant and positive in both the Inherited and Hard Work conditions, but, contrary to 
expectations, was stronger in magnitude within the Hard Work condition. 
A subsequent process model examined whether Liberalism would moderate the 
direct effect of Source and/or the indirect effect of Source via the perceived fairness of 
the source of the entrepreneur’s initial wealth. Intuitively, and as expected, Source had a 
significant indirect effect on envy whereby Hard Work lessened envy because the hard 
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work was considered a fairer source of initial wealth than Inherited wealth. Liberalism 
did not moderate that mediated effect, but it marginally-significantly moderated the 
(marginal) direct effect of Source on envy. Interestingly, after taking into account the 
stronger, negative indirect effect of Source on envy via fairness, no significant direct 
effect of Source on envy remained among political conservatives, but a weak, positive 
direct effect was observed among liberals. After a series of follow-up analyses described 
in Results, I ultimately came to the tentative conclusion that liberals’ greater envy of 
wealthy entrepreneurs in general meant that only they had an appreciable amount of envy 
left over to explain after taking into account the indirect effect.  
Resentment was modestly increased by Inherited wealth, but Source’s effect on 
envy was not moderated by Liberalism. The lack of an interaction effect may have been a 
consequence of the relatively weak effect of the manipulation itself, or it simply may 
have had a similar impact on liberals’ and conservatives’ resentment of the entrepreneurs.  
Although complex in a number of ways, some straightforward points can be made 
about the observed pattern of effects for Source. Regardless of political affiliation, 
Inherited wealth tends to be perceived as less fair than wealth earned through Hard Work, 
and the effects on envy of Source are explained by such fairness judgments. Furthermore, 
in line with historical example and contemporary moral psychological theories, (such as 
DMT and MFT), “unfair” Inherited wealth appears to engender substantially less envy 
than self-enrichment at the expense of others. For example, Inherited wealth condition 
had virtually no impact on moral disgust, an emotion strongly associated with perceived 
unfair treatment (e.g., Chapman et al., 2009), whereas Harmful actions greatly increased 
moral disgust.  
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Harmful Actions. As expected, the manipulation with stronger effects on the 
emotional reactions and moral judgments of both conservatives and liberals was Harmful 
Actions. Self-enriching actions that clearly harmed others’ economic well-being 
increased envy, resentment, anger, and moral disgust among people across the political 
spectrum. Likewise, conservatives and liberals considered Harmful actions to be much 
less fair than actions that did no apparent harm. It would appear, then, that while there 
might be a degree of truth to conservative claims that liberal opposition to wealth is 
driven by envy, the same might be said about conservatives who oppose it—as with 
liberals, conservatives’ envy/opposition to wealth increases as a function of certain 
contextual factors, such as harm, and fairness and justice concerns played prominent 
explanatory roles in both conservative and liberal envy.  
Although Harmful Actions had effects that were similar in kind regardless of 
Political Ideology, as predicted, the mediated effect of Harmful Actions on envy via the 
perceived fairness of the entrepreneur’s actions was more pronounced among liberals 
than conservatives, as liberals’ fairness judgments were more strongly affected by 
Harmful Actions than those of conservatives. Such was the case despite the failure to 
obtain the predicted Harmful Actions X Liberalism interaction in the multiple regression 
model. This is not entirely surprising, as it is possible to obtain significant indirect effects 
of a predictor which has no significant total effect (e.g., Hayes, 2009), and fairness was 
predicted to be a major explanatory factor for any Harmful Actions X Liberalism 
interaction. Despite the predicted moderation by Liberalism of the direct effect of 
Harmful Actions on envy, in light of the results just described, the failure to obtain a 
moderated direct effect was not surprising, given the non-significance of the direct effect 
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of Harmful Actions on envy (i.e., the effect of Harmful Actions on envy remaining after 
taking into account its indirect effect via the perceived fairness of the entrepreneur’s 
actions). In short, harmful actions increased envy, but the increase among liberals was 
more pronounced because the harmful actions were considered especially unfair by them 
(and/or especially harmful; Schein & Gray, 2015). 
Main effects of both Liberalism and Harmful Actions were observed on 
resentment, but the predicted Harmful Actions X Liberalism interaction on resentment 
was not. Two possible reasons for the latter finding come to mind. First, blatantly 
harmful actions may have seemed relatively “objectively” unfair to liberals and 
conservatives, increasing their resentment of the entrepreneur roughly equivalently. On 
the other hand, mirroring findings on envy, there may have been no total effect of the 
interaction on resentment, despite an (unexamined) indirect effect of that interaction via 
enhanced unfairness perceptions. 
Subjective SES 
Taken together with the finding that subjective SES was only modestly zero-order 
correlated with envy, results of the exploratory analysis on possible interactive effects 
between Liberalism and subjective SES failed to support the notion that envious reactions 
to wealthy people are primarily driven by perceived differences in SES or relative 
deprivation. Instead, they buttressed the general conclusion that justice concerns are 
probably more important determinants of negative emotional reactions to wealthy people, 
as well as ideology-based differences in such reactions, than subjective SES. These 
findings challenge the ideas that (1) links between liberal political ideology and envy 
might be substantially stronger among people low in SES, and (2) coming from a low 
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SES background increases only liberals’ envy—subjective SES was weakly associated 
with envy, regardless of Political Ideology.  
Limitations 
 The current study entailed measuring the self-reported judgments and emotional 
reactions of online participants. The emotional reactions participants experienced were in 
response to ostensibly-real, wealthy entrepreneurs. That is, participants reacted to “real” 
emotional events, rather than indicating their imagined reactions to simulated events, a 
potentially problematic methodology which can exacerbate underreporting of envy and 
other undesirable emotions (e.g., Smith & Kim, 2007). Further, attention checks and 
open-ended suspicion check questions allowed a substantial degree of data quality control 
despite the remote location of the participants. Finally, because the final sample included 
800 participants, statistical power was relatively high for most, if not all analyses. 
Despite the considerable methodological strengths of this study, a number of 
limitations must be acknowledged. First, self-reports are vulnerable to social desirability 
biases and limitations in participants’ ability to accurately report the bases of their 
thoughts and feelings (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). Nonetheless, complex, “blended” social 
emotions such as envy have proved difficult to study without using self-reports (van de 
Ven et al., 2015; Hoogland et al., in press). For example, to my knowledge, there is 
currently no well-validated implicit measure of envy (whether hostile or otherwise), and, 
unlike anger or moral disgust, envy lacks a signature facial expression that could be 
measured with EEG or other technologies. Given the relatively small effect sizes 
observed in this study, it might be prohibitively costly or time-intensive to conduct well-
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powered, physiology-based research examining political ideology’s effects on emotional 
reactions to wealthy people.  
Arguably the greatest limitation of this study was that no manipulation of political 
ideology was included (e.g., cognitive load; Eidelman, Crandall, Goodman, & Blanchar, 
2012), precluding causal conclusions from being made about the effects of political 
ideology on envy. Still, the factors that were manipulated in this study had a number of 
effects which were modulated by political ideology, which, at the very least, strongly 
suggested that political ideology’s role in reactions to wealthy people can vary based on 
pertinent contextual factors.    
Future Directions 
 Because effects of political ideology on envy were influenced by contextual 
factors, it appears possible, or even likely, that under some circumstances, conservatives 
might experience more envy of wealthy people than liberals. To name one such 
possibility, conservatives might begrudge the wealth of “undeserving” alternative energy 
entrepreneurs who have benefitted financially from government grants to a greater extent 
than liberals, who might instead feel benign envy or admiration toward them. Further, 
longitudinal research might reveal if dispositional envy leads to increased liberalism,25 
liberalism leads to greater dispositional envy, both, or neither.  
 As noted, in this and other psychological studies, unidimensional measures of 
political ideology have been used successfully, but researchers such as Everett (2013) 
have argued that although economic and social conservatism/liberalism are related, they 
may be usefully distinguished (e.g., libertarians might be considered high in economic 
                                                 
25 Previous research has suggested that basic dispositions may drive ideological choices (Iyer, Koleva, 
Graham, Ditto, & Haidt, 2012). 
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conservatism but low in social conservatism; Everett, 2013). Economic liberalism is 
probably much more relevant to reactions to wealthy people26 than social liberalism, and 
thus it seems possible that social liberalism might have little impact above and beyond 
economic liberalism on such reactions. An even finer-grained approach might involve 
measuring whether some economic attitudes are especially predictive of reactions to 
wealthy people (e.g., attitudes toward business as opposed to welfare benefits; Everett, 
2013), as the consistency between attitudes and behavior increases as the attitude 
becomes more specific and relevant to the behavior of interest (Kraus, 1995). Still other 
measurement approaches might focus on self-identification as a liberal or conservative 
rather than underlying political ideologies (Conover & Feldman, 1981), especially if a 
wealthy target’s political leanings are made clear, allowing stronger intergroup dynamics 
to emerge. 
 Another relevant empirical challenge might be to attempt to tease out when 
socially- and personally-unacceptable feelings of envy might transmute into more 
“righteous” resentment or indignation, anger, or even moral disgust. Might conservatives 
be more adept at such a coping process than liberals? This possibility is not as far-fetched 
as it might seem at first blush, as conservatives tend to claim greater happiness than 
liberals,27 a difference based not only on system-justifying ideologies (e.g., Jost, 2006; 
                                                 
26 This seems especially likely when such wealthy people happen to be living relatively conventional 
lifestyles.  
27 See Wojcik et al. (2015) for evidence that conservatives’ greater self-reported happiness might be 
mediated by their tendency toward self-deceptive enhancement (e.g., reporting unrealistic levels of 
happiness), and behavioral evidence indicating liberals may experience and display (yet not report) slightly 
more happiness on average than conservatives. Wojcik et al.’s (2015) work also underscored the value of 
controlling for socially-desirable response tendencies in psychological research comparing liberals and 
conservatives (as was the case for focal analyses in the current research). 
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Jost & Hunyady, 2005), but also on certain personality characteristics, such as greater 
personal agency (Schlenker et al., 2012).28 
 A final avenue for future research might be to explore why liberals may be less 
trusting of wealthy people who ostensibly have earned their wealth and have not hurt 
anybody in the pursuit of further wealth. Making reference to perceived justice concerns 
would not appear to tell the whole story, as liberal ideology was associated with less 
positive perceptions of the wealthy person within the Not Harmful condition (e.g., lesser 
perceived competence and greater perceived greed). It also seems possible that those 
perceptions were driven by an offended sense of distributive justice (Janoff-Bulman & 
Carnes, 2013). 
Conclusion 
 Liberals might be slightly more prone to envy. Larger ideology-related 
differences in envy of specific, wealthy people, however, may be explained by legitimate 
justice concerns to a substantial extent. Future research in which both political ideology 
and contextual factors are experimentally manipulated will be necessary to conclusively 
establish that political ideology plays a causal role in envy across a variety of situations, 
rather than extraneous factors associated with political ideology or particular situations. 
Nonetheless, the various complexities revealed in the current research suggest that neither 
                                                 
28 Schlenker and colleagues (2012) offered a “positive adjustment” explanation for differences in happiness 
between conservatives and liberals, as conservatives tend to be higher in several characteristics positively 
associated with mental health, including optimism, personal agency, religiosity, and a domain-general 
belief that life is fair. They also attributed a decline in liberals’ happiness as income inequality has risen to 
a concomitant increase in secularism (see General Discussion, Schlenker et al., 2012). Although Schlenker 
et al.’s (2012) findings are enlightening, judgments of the fairness of wealthy people’s economic activities 
were a focus of this study, and thus conservatives’ greater endorsement of economic system-justifying 
beliefs were of much greater relevance to the topic at hand. Nonetheless, the extent to which either system-
justifying ideologies or overall positive adjustment provide better explanations for conservatives’ greater 
self-reported life satisfaction is itself an important topic for future research. 
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conservative nor liberal explanations for opposition to wealth fully capture a more 
nuanced reality. Much more remains to be learned about the whys and wherefores of 
ideology-based differences in reactions to wealthy people of varied stripes. 
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Appendix A 
Summary of Initial and Final Experimental Conditions 
Initial Experimental Conditions 
 
1 (Andy first)  Andy X Hard Work X Not Harmful; Gary X Hard Work X Not Harmful  
2 (Andy first) Andy X Hard Work X Harmful; Gary X Hard Work X Harmful  
3 (Andy first) Andy X Inherited X Not Harmful; Gary X Inherited X Not Harmful  
4 (Andy first)  Andy X Inherited X Harmful; Gary X Inherited X Harmful  
5 (Gary first)  Gary X Inherited X Not Harmful; Andy X Inherited X Not Harmful  
6 (Gary first) Gary X Inherited X Harmful; Andy X Inherited X Harmful 
7 (Gary first) Gary X Hard Work X Not Harmful; Andy X Hard Work X Not Harmful 
8 (Gary first)  Gary X Hard Work X Harmful; Andy X Hard Work X Harmful 
 
Final Experimental Conditions* 
 
1 Hard Work X Not Harmful 
2 Hard Work X Harmful 
3 Inherited X Not Harmful 
4 Inherited X Harmful 
 
 
*NOTE: Both the order and specific company/entrepreneur (i.e., ball bearing company 
buyer Gary Taylor vs. hubcap manufacturing company buyer Andy Simmons) conditions 
were collapsed, yielding the final, 2 X 2 between-subjects design. 
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Appendix B 
Andy X Hard Work X Not Harmful Article  
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Andy X Hard Work X Harmful Article 
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Andy X Inherited X Not Harmful Article 
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Andy X Inherited X Harmful Article 
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Gary X Hard Work X Not Harmful Article 
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Gary X Hard Work X Harmful Article 
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Gary X Inherited X Not Harmful Article 
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Gary X Inherited X Harmful Article 
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Strongly 
Agree 
Disagree 
Appendix C 
Reactions to Stimulus Articles 
Please indicate how reading the article made you think about or regarding [Entrepreneur] 
and/or his profession by selecting a number on the scale below that best fits your view 
and then entering it into the space next to each item.  
 
1. [Entrepreneur’s] actions were fair.  
2. [Entrepreneur’s] actions were good for the overall economy. 
3. I believe [Entrepreneur] helped save the [Kansas/Ohio] company. 
4. [Entrepreneur] is a very skilled businessperson. 
5. I am a little envious of [Entrepreneur]. 
6. [Entrepreneur] did his duty for his investors by taking the actions he did with the 
[Kansas/Ohio] company. 
7. [Entrepreneur] harmed the company in [Kansas/Ohio]. 
8. [Entrepreneur] is greedy. 
9. [Entrepreneur’s] initial wealth was earned through hard work. 
10. [Entrepreneur’s] initial wealth was given to him by family.  
11. The way [Entrepreneur] got his initial wealth was fair. 
12. [Entrepreneur’s] source of startup money was fair. 
13. I resent [Entrepreneur’s] actions. 
14. I resent [Entrepreneur’s] wealth. 
15. It is frustrating that [Entrepreneur] is better off than I am. 
16. This is an attention check. Please choose answer “3” for this question. 
17. [Entrepreneur] seems to be intelligent. 
18. I feel inspired to get wealth myself. 
19. [Entrepreneur’s] actions were disgusting. 
20. [Entrepreneur’s] wealth is disgusting. 
21. I want to put in effort to obtain wealth myself. 
22. I hope [Entrepreneur] suffers a serious financial setback. 
23. I like [Entrepreneur]. 
24. I am a little jealous of [Entrepreneur’s] wealth. 
25. [Entrepreneur’s] way of turning around companies is good for the country. 
26. I think about what it would be like to have [Entrepreneur’s] wealth. 
27. [Entrepreneur] harmed the workers in the [Kansas/Ohio] company. 
28. [Entrepreneur’s] actions with the company were unfair. 
29. [Entrepreneur’s] actions make me angry. 
30. [Entrepreneur’s] wealth makes me angry. 
31. Reading about [Entrepreneur] makes me want to work harder. 
32. I wish [Entrepreneur] weren’t so successful. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree 
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33. I can’t help but resent [Entrepreneur] for his success. 
34. [Entrepreneur] is a great role model. 
35. I want to have [Entrepreneur’s] wealth as well. 
36. [Entrepreneur] lacks compassion for company employees. 
37. I am happy for [Entrepreneur]. 
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Appendix D 
Individual Differences Measures 
Political Ideology Scale (endpoints: 1 = completely disagree, 7 = completely agree) 
(Adapted from Morgan et al., 2010) 
 
1. I agree with Democrats on political issues. 
2. I agree with Republicans on political issues. 
3. I am liberal in my political views. 
4. I am conservative in my political views. 
 
Dispositional Envy Scale (endpoints: 1 = strongly disagree, 6 = strongly agree) (Smith 
et al., 1999) 
 
1. I feel envy every day. 
2. The bitter truth is that I generally feel inferior to others. 
3. Feelings of envy constantly torment me. 
4. It is so frustrating to see some people succeed so easily.  
5. No matter what I do, envy always plagues me.  
6. I am troubled by feelings of inadequacy. 
7. It somehow doesn’t seem fair that some people seem to have all the talent. 
8. Frankly, the success of my neighbors makes me resent them. 
 
Dispositional Benign and Malicious Envy Scales (endpoints: 1 = strongly disagree, 6 
= strongly agree) (Lange & Crusius, 2014) 
 
1. When I envy others, I focus on how I can become equally successful in the future. 
2. I wish that superior people would lose their advantage. 
3. If I notice that another person is better than me, I try to improve myself. 
4. Envying others motivates me to accomplish my goals. 
5. If other people have something that I want for myself, I wish to take it away from 
them. 
6. I feel ill will toward people I envy. 
7. I strive to reach other people’s superior achievements. 
8. Envious feelings cause me to dislike the other person. 
9. If someone has superior qualities, achievements, or possessions, I try to attain 
them for myself. 
10. Seeing other people’s achievements makes me resent them. 
 
Short Social Desirability Scale (endpoints: 1 = strongly disagree, 6 = strongly agree) 
(Reynolds, 1982) 
 
1. It is sometimes hard for me to go on with my work if I am not encouraged. 
2. I sometimes feel resentful when I don't get my way. 
3. On a few occasions, I have given up doing something because I thought too little of 
my ability. 
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4. There have been times when I felt like rebelling against people in authority even 
though I knew they were right. 
5. No matter who I'm talking to, I'm always a good listener. 
6. There have been occasions when I took advantage of someone. 
7. I'm always willing to admit it when I make a mistake. 
8. I don't find it particularly difficult to get along with loud mouthed, obnoxious 
people. 
9. I am always courteous, even to people who are disagreeable. 
10. I have never been irked when people expressed ideas very different from my own. 
11. There have been times when I was quite jealous of the good fortune of others. 
12. I am sometimes irritated by people who ask favors of me. 
13. I have never deliberately said something that hurt someone’s feelings 
 
Subjective SES “Ladder” Scale (Ditto et al., 2013) 
 
Think of this ladder, to the right, as 
representing where people stand in your 
country. 
 
At the top of the ladder are the people who are 
the best off - those who have the most money, 
the most education, and the most respected jobs. 
At the bottom are the people who are the worst 
off - who have the least money, least education, 
and the least respected jobs or no job. The higher 
up you are on this ladder, the closer you are to 
the people at the very top; the lower you are, the 
closer you are to the people at the very bottom. 
 
Where would you place yourself on this 
ladder? 
Please choose the radio button corresponding to 
the position on the ladder where you think you 
stand at this time in your life, compared to 
people in your country. 
-> 
-> 
-> 
-> 
-> 
-> 
-> 
-> 
-> 
-> 
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